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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to UTAH CODE
ANN.

§§ 78-2-2(3)(a) and 78-2-5 and Rule 45 of the

UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE

PROCEDURE.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether Woodside had knowledge of defective soil conditions on the property

sold to Appellees/Respondents.
2.

Whether conditions existing on a parcel of land near the property sold to

Appellees/Respondents were material to the conditions existing on Appellees/Respondents'
lot, whether Woodside knew of those conditions or had a duty to discover them, and whether
Woodside had a duty to disclose the conditions on the nearby parcel.

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A,

Nature of the Case.
Ali Yazd and Parvin Yousefi filed a lawsuit against Woodside accusing Woodside of

engaging in fraudulent conduct by intentionally concealing or failing to disclose to Appellees
information that allegedly reveals the existence of collapsible soils beneath the house
Woodside constructed for Appellees. To establish their claims, Appellees were required to
show by clear and convincing evidence that Woodside knew about the existence of
collapsible soils on Appellees' lot and failed to disclose such information. Appellees'
attempted to do this by alleging Woodside had such knowledge from a soils report for an
adjoining parcel of property.
Appellees were unable to produce evidence to support their claims. Instead, the
evidence shows that Woodside removed all the collapsible soil of which it was aware from
beneath Appellees' house prior to its construction. Because Appellees could not and cannot
meet their burden, the district court properly entered summary judgment in favor of
Woodside.
Appellees appealed the district court's decision. The Court of Appeals declined to
hold oral argument on the appeal and therefore made its decision on the briefs submitted by
the parties. The Court of Appeals filed its decision on February 25, 2005. See Yazd v.
Woodside Homes. 2005 UT App. 82, 109 P.3d 393. In its decision, the Court of Appeals
reversed and remanded the district court's entry of summary judgment concluding that there
were issues of fact concerning when Woodside obtained the information contained in a soils
report covering a neighboring parcel of land. See KL at ^[15.

B,

Course of Proceedings.
Appellees filed their complaint against Woodside on April 27,2002 asserting claims

for relief for fraudulent concealment, fraudulent non-disclosure, breach of warranty, mutual
mistake and unilateral mistake. (R. at 000-011.) In response, Woodside filed a motion to
dismiss and compel arbitration. (R. at 15-17.) Judge Schofield granted the motion in part,
ordering that Appellees' contract claims were subject to arbitration. (R. at 106-109.) On
August 25, 2003, Woodside filed a motion for summary judgment on the remaining fraud
claims based on Appellees' failure to provide clear and convincing evidence that Woodside
was aware of collapsible soils on Appellees' lot. (R. at 393-537.) In an order dated
November 19, 2003, Judge Stott granted Woodside's motion for summary judgment. (R. at
904-906.) (Copies of the district court's Ruling and Order are included in the Addendum
hereto at Tabs A and B, respectively.) Appellees filed their notice of appeal from that order
on November 25, 2003. (R. at 907-908.)
While this appeal was pending, Appellees chose to pursue their contract claims that
were subject to arbitration. The arbitration on Appellees' contract claims was held on
September 14-15, 2004, and the arbitrator awarded damages to Appellees to compensate
them for the cost of repairing their house. (See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Support of Motion to Dismiss Appeal as Moot filed with the Court of Appeals on November
19,2004 at 2 and Ex. A thereto.) The district court entered an Order Confirming Arbitration
Award and Judgment on October 21, 2004, and Appellees' counsel signed a Satisfaction of
Judgment on November 1, 2004. (Copies of the Order Confirming Arbitration Award and

Judgment and Satisfaction of Judgment are attached as Exs. B and C, respectively, to the
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to Dismiss Appeal as Moot.)
In light of the arbitrator's award and entry of Satisfaction of Judgment, Woodside
filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal as Moot on November 19, 2004. The Court of Appeals
denied Woodside's Motion to Dismiss in its opinion issued on February 25, 2005, wherein
it also reversed and remanded the district court's grant of summary judgment. (A copy of
the opinion is included in the Addendum hereto at Tab C.) Woodside filed a Petition for
Rehearing with the Court of Appeals on March 11, 2005. The Court of Appeals denied the
Petition for Rehearing in an Order dated April 12, 2005. Subsequently, Woodside filed a
Petition for Writ of Certiorari with this Court on May 12, 2005. Woodside's Petition for
Writ of Certiorari was granted in an Order from this Court dated July 18, 2005.
C

Statement of Material Facts.l
1,

Woodside owned land that became the Panorama Point subdivision

("Subdivision") located in Lindon, Utah. (R. at 521-524, 720.)

1

As is mentioned in Woodside's Petition for Certiorari, its statement of material facts
is taken primarily from its Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. (R.
at 533-536.) Appellees did not dispute facts 1-8 and 12-13 in the district court. (R. at 720722.) In addition, Appellees failed to comply with Utah Rule of Judicial Administration 4501(2)(b), which was then in effect and has since been codified in Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 7, in their effort to dispute Woodside's facts 9-11 and 15-18 (R. at 764-768)
because Appellees failed to "specifically refer to those portions of the record upon which
[they] relie[d]" in attempting to raise an issue of fact. UTAH R. JUD. ADMIN. 4-501(2)(b).
Because Appellees failed to dispute the facts underlying Woodside's Motion for Summary
Judgment, those facts must be deemed admitted for purposes of this appeal. See kl The
Court of Appeals did not mention Utah Rule of Judicial Administration 4-501(2)(b) in its
opinion and did not deem Woodside's facts admitted. Fact 14 comes directly from the Delta
Report, which Appellees rely on in their attempt to show Woodside engaged in fraudulent
conduct.
A

2.

In preparation for the construction of the Subdivision, Woodside requested that

a geotechnical engineering firm now known as Amec ("Amec") conduct an investigation of
the soils in the Subdivision and provide a report (the "SHB Report") (R. at 471-514) of that
investigation to Woodside. (R. at 517, 521-524, 721.)
3.

Amec drilled eight test pits throughout the Subdivision ranging in depth from

ten to twelve feet from which they evaluated the condition of the soil. (R. at 512, 721.)
4.

The SHB Report disclosed that "[t]he most significant geotechnical aspect of

the site is the upper one and one-half to two and one-half feet of soil which are moisturesensitive, collapsible" and recommended the removal or compaction of the collapsible soils.
(R. at 507, 721.)
5.

On or about April 8, 1992, Delta Geotechnical Consultants Inc. prepared a

geotechnical study ("Delta Report") for the LDS Church for a site neighboring the
Subdivision ("Church Site") where the LDS Church was contemplating the construction of
a stake center, which is a large meetinghouse. (R. at 409-454, 721.)
6.

The Delta Report disclosed the presence of "6 to 16 feet of loose sandy silt

underlain by loose to medium dense silty sand." (R. at 449, 721.)
7.

The Delta Report did not include an analysis of the soil in the Subdivision,

generally or specifically, or for lot 304 ("Lot 304"), the lot purchased later by Appellees. (R.
at 450, 721.)
8.

Subsequent to the completion of the Delta Report, Woodside purchased the

Church Site from the Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the LDS Church ("CPB"). (R.
at 523, 721.)
5

9.

Blaine Livingston, the CPB representative, did not personally deliver a copy

of the Delta Report to anyone at Woodside. Instead, Livingston followed his standard
practice of preparing a copy of the Delta Report and instructing an assistant to mail a copy
of the Delta Report to Woodside. Mr. Livingston's assistant did not send the Delta Report
to Woodside by registered mail or certified mail. Mr. Livingston does not know if the Delta
Report was actually received by Woodside. (R. at 406-407.)
10.

Woodside did not see a copy of the Delta Report until some time in 1997,

which is long after the Appellees moved into their home on Lot 304. (R. at 646.)
11.

Woodside discussed the Church Site with William Gordon, the soils engineer

who prepared the SHB Report, and believed that the soil conditions at the Church Site were
the same as the soil conditions disclosed in the SHB Report. Woodside also understood that
the project that the LDS Church was considering involved a large single structure, that was
significantly different in form and character, as well as its impact on the land, from the single
family homes that Woodside was planning to build. (R. at 534.)
12.

On or about March 11, 1995, Appellees entered into a Purchase Agreement

("Agreement") with Woodside for the construction of a house on Lot 304 of the Subdivision.
(R. at 535, 721.)
13.

The property upon which Lot 304 is located was covered by the SHB Report.

(R. at 471, 721.)
14.

The closest test hole to Lot 304 discussed in the Delta Report, test hole 6, is

120 feet away from a corner of Appellees' lot and reveals the presence of collapsible soils
to a depth of five feet (R. at 429, 436 (the scale of which is P=60').)

15,

During the construction of Appellees' house, six to eight feet of soil were

removed from Lot 304. (R. at 403-04 ("[t]he mass excavation has been completed and
extends anywhere from six to eight feet below original grade
16.

"); R. at 400.)

Before the foundation for Appellees' house was laid, engineer Gordon visited

Lot 304 to inspect the mass excavation. He determined that the underlying soils would
support the house and made certain recommendations concerning the placement and
compaction of structural fill. Gordon's conclusions and recommendations are contained in
a field report he provided to Woodside ("Field Report"). (R. at 403-04.)
17.

Woodside understood that the mass excavation of Lot 304 had removed all

collapsible soils from Lot 304. (R. at 400.)
18,

Woodside followed the recommendations made by Gordon in the Field Report

before laying the foundation for Appellees' house. (R. at 400.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"On certiorari, [this Court] review[s] the court of appeals' decision for correctness,
focusing on whether that court correctly reviewed the trial court's decision under the
appropriate standard of review." Hansen v. Evre, 2005 UT 29, ^[8, 116 P.3d 290 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). "When reviewing a court's decision to grant summary
judgment, [the Court] examinefs] the court's legal conclusions for correctness." Smith v.
Four Corners Mental Health Ctr.. Inc.. 2003 UT 23, % 13, 70 P.3d 904 (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).

7

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Tin1 ilr,I1 . ' ( " I ' u ' i H i l l ' delumined th.il AppHlw • wilt" unable In shun l»> Icai
and convincing evidence that Woodside was aware of adverse soil conditions on the lot they
purchased from Woodside. Because Woodside had no knowledge of adverse soil conditions
on Appellees' lot, it follows that Woodside did not fraudulently conceal or fail to disclose

that Woodside understood that all collapsible soils were ivnu IN etl Ironi beneath

ppdlt/tV

house prior to construction. The Court of Appeals ignored the undisputed facts in its opinion
and incorrectly reversed the district court's decision.
'"'?'

I I LSI*

i'1

:.

-

•

-

.

»

. »<

\i ' '

emphasizes the contents of the Delta Report, which analyze- * >u - >• *

His "

\,S

,11,

..*-... i .»

of property adjacent to a corner of Appellees' lot. Contrary to the Court of Appeals
conclusion, the Delta Report was not material to the conditions on Appellees' lot because it
due no) ailcliev, tlit1 MIIIII i oniliiMin

mi Appellees lol <nul is consistent w it! :t the knowledge

that Woodside had concerning soil conditions <

npellees' lul In ixlihliun, (In1 Cumi of

Appeals misconstrued the contents of th e Delta Report, concluding that it disclosed
information that it simply does not contain. This conclusion incorrectly colored the Court
ot Appeals' tlelrniiiii.idiui lli.il llir I h li.i Kcpon \\A\ in,in nnl

I In; i in (disputed facts also

showed that Woodside did not possess the Delta Report nor was it aware of tl ic spec ific
conclusions contained in the Delta Report until approximately two years after Appellees'
house was built.

In its opinion, the Court of Appeals created an onerous new duty for builders. The
Court of Appeals' ruling as it presently stands will require every builder and developer to
discover conditions not only on the property they are selling but on neighboring property as
well. Further, what constitutes neighboring property is unclear. A builder will then be
required to provide all of the information it finds concerning neighboring property, as well
as any information learned by others, to the potential buyer or be subject to fraud liability.
Such an expansive duty is unrecognized by this or any other court. The correct duties a
builder must fulfill under Utah law are set out in Fennell v. Green. UT App. 291, 77 P.3d
339, and Smith v. Frandsen. 2005 UT 55,94 P.3d 919. (Copies of the Fennell and Frandsen
opinions are included in the Addendum hereto at Tabs D and E, respectively.) The court of
appeals did not apply Fennell and incorrectly applied Frandsen to the facts of this case. A
proper application of FenneU and Frandsen to the present case shows that Woodside fulfilled
all of its duties to Appellees.
ARGUMENT
L

WOODSIDE DID NOT HAVE KNOWLEDGE OF DEFECTIVE SOIL
CONDITIONS ON APPELLEES1 LOT.
In order to prevail on a claim of fraudulent concealment, "a plaintiff must prove the

following three elements: (1) the nondisclosed information is material, (2) the nondisclosed
information is known to the party failing to disclose, and (3) there is a legal duty to
communicate."

Mitchell v. Christensen, 31 P.3d 572, 574 (Utah 2001),

Similarly,

"[fraudulent concealment requires that one with a legal duty or obligation to communicate
certain facts remain silent or otherwise act to conceal material facts known to him."
o

McDougal v Weed, 945 I 2 1 1 5 5, 1 ; 9 (I Ital i " \ { \\ ,199 ]r)

" I I lei efi >re, I >< >tl > fraudulent

nondisclosure and fraudulent otuvaliiinil ivi|imr llnil ilir niiiortii,ilioii thai is n I His* I '\nl
be known to the party who did not disclose it. In addition, a plaintiff bears the burden of
proving fraud by clear and convincing evidence. See Franco v. Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter Day Saints,
Co.. 833 F,2d 86

^

•:., cf. Colorado v. Western Paving Const.
-

-

• m.

>

fraudulent nondisclosure claim).
Based on the undisputed facts found by the district court, which the Court of Appeals
fail sd to deem i idi i iitted, tl le disti let ecu n t held that:
(1) prior to construction, Woodside was aware of the existence of collapsible soils on
Plaintiffs' lot to a depth of two and one-half feet; (2) between six and eight feet of soil
was removed during the excavation for Plaintiffs' house; (3) after inspecting the
excavation, a soils engineer indicated to Woodside that the underlying soils would
support the Plaintiffs' house; (4) Woodside followed the recommendations ofthe soils
engineer in laying the foundation of Plaintiffs' house; and (5) during construction and
after the completion of Plaintiffs' house, Woodside understood that all of the
collapsible soils had been removed from Plaintiffs' lot. Plaintiffs have not
demonstrated that Woodside had any knowledge of remaining collapsible soils on
Plaintiffs' lot. Therefore, Plaintiffs failed to raise any issue of material fact that
would preclude entry of summary judgment in favor of Woodside.
(R. at 900.) The undisputed facts thus showed that Woodside had no knowledge of defective
soil -Miifhliliuib uii tin jpn»|K'il> sold to Appellees.
Rather than deeming the undisputed facts ptvsnitnf h\ Wnndsidi imhf. HIMHI i

nd

admitted, as required by Utah Rule Judicial Administration 4-501(2)(b), and reviewing the
district court's decision for correctness, the Court of Appeals sought to create issues of fact
th.t

s

*

co\ irt and did i lot impact Woodside's actual knowledge

of the soil conditions on Appellees' 1< »t "I he lyi icl IJ )ii i c A tl ie C< >i n t c »f Appc als' decision is

its conclusion that the Delta Report is material as a matter of law and should have been
disclosed to Appellees. This conclusion was based on a misreading of the Delta Report and
a failure to evaluate Woodside's actual knowledge of the soil conditions on Appellees' lot.
As a result, the Court of Appeals incorrectly reversed the district court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of Woodside.
The Court of Appeals incorrectly states that the Delta Report revealed the existence
of collapsible soils at a depth of thirty feet at a test hole that was "no more than" thirty feet
away from Appellees' lot. Yazd, 2005 UT App. 82,ffif4, 9. This finding is unsupported by
the record. In fact, the record shows that the area covered by the Delta Report only borders
a far comer of Appellees' lot, and the nearest test hole discussed in the Delta Report was
more than 120 feet away from Appellees' lot. (R. at 436.) Test hole 6 is 120 feet away from
the southwest comer of Appellees' lot (and an even greater distance from Appellees' house)
and does not reveal the existence of collapsible soils to a depth of thirty feet. Instead, it
reveals collapsible soils to a depth of five feet, which is less than the normal depth of
excavation for constructing a house foundation and less than the amount of soil that was
excavated from Appellees lot (six to eight feet of soil were removed from Appellees' lot).
(R. at 400,403-04,429,900.) Such information would therefore not change the fact that as
far as Woodside knew all collapsible soils would be and were removed from Appellees' lot.
Further, contrary to what is stated in the Yazd opinion, the disclosure of collapsible soils at
a depth of thirty feet is not found anywhere in the Delta Report. The Delta Report,
discussing the general condition of the soil on the Church Site, states "the [twelve] test holes
encountered 6 to 16 feet of loose sandy silt underlain by loose to medium dense silty sand."
11

i| \{ \\ liQ \ Ciivf'ii 'ill (lull m'i Mii»iii|!ii(ii'il ni i i|ii» (h llli.i ll"n,(Nn( iiiiilniii!1 in it changes the
knowledge that Woodside had about the* soil tonditioir in

ipptlUvs ini HI V iiodsnilr •,

understanding that all collapsible soils related to construction of the home were removed
from Appellees" lot.2
Complete^
knowledge Woodside had at the time '\ \ •> <!.,••-

M i ^-s

decision is a discussion ol ^hat
< tsotnstnKlnl ntm/h is Iherenlnil

issue to establishing Appellees' claims. While it is undisputed that Woodside did not have
the Delta Report until two years after Appellees' house was built, Woodside has stated that
lini |nii|H>ses ol iliis apjK -il, (In1 'i iMI111 <iin impuU ^. Knowledge contained in the Delta
Report to Woodside. With that imputed knowledge
light most favorable to Appellees, the facts found by the district court would only be changed
as follows: (1) prior to construction, Woodside was aware of the existence of collapsible
tub mi \ppiiia • In! In ,i nit fillli ml (<\ ojtid tine-halt 1'eet and in a test pit 120 feet away from
a corner of Appellees' lot to a depth of five feet; (2) betw een six ai id eigl it feet c f soi 1 ;as
removed during the excavation for Appellees' house; (3) after inspecting the excavation, a
soils engineer indicated to Woodside that the underlying soils would support the Appellees'
liousi , (-I) \\ IMMIMIIC inllnw t\l (In1 laomnu'iidulions ol the soils engineei in laying the
foundation of Appellees' house; and (5) during constnulinn ,nul .il'lei l!n' I'oniplclinr »l

2

The fact that Woodside received a specific report for Appellees' lot, after the lot had
been excavated from six to eight feet below original grade, stating that u[t]he underlying soils
are the natural clayey silts which when undisturbed will adequately support footing designed
to impose maximum net bearing pressure of 1,500 pounds per square foot" further supports
the conclusion that Woodside understood that all collapsible soils were removed from
Appellees'lot (R. at 403.)

Appellees' house, Woodside understood that all of the collapsible soils had been removed
from Appellees' lot. Even with the information in the Delta Report imputed to Woodside,
Appellees are unable to provide any evidence demonstrating that Woodside had knowledge
of the presence of collapsible soils on Appellees' lot. Because there is no evidence to
support Appellees' allegations of fraudulent conduct, the Court should reverse the decision
of the Court of Appeals and affirm the district court's entry of summary judgment in favor
of Woodside.
II.

THE CONDITIONS DISCLOSED IN THE DELTA REPORT ARE NOT
MATERIAL TO THE CONDITIONS ON APPELLEES' LOT AND DO NOT
CREATE DUTIES OF DISCOVERY OR DISCLOSURE FOR WOODSIDE.
The Court of Appeals put a great deal of emphasis on the contents of the Delta Report

and Delta Report's relevance to Appellees' lot. The Court of Appeals fundamentally misread
the Delta Report, however, and in so doing, created an unreasonable and onerous new burden
for builders and developers.
A.

The Conditions on the Parcel of Land Near Appellees' Lot Were Not
Material to the Conditions on Appellees' Lot.

The Court of Appeals correctly states that this Court has previously held "that
materiality is something which a buyer or seller of ordinary intelligence and prudence would
think to be of some importance in determining whether to buy or sell." Hermansen v.
TasuHs, 2002 UT 52, ^ 29, 48 P.3d 245 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).3

3

The holding of Smith v. Frandsen. 2004 UT 55, 94 P.3d 919, which is discussed
below, indicates that information about neighboring parcels is not material as a matter of law.
Under Frandsen, a buyer is required to request information about adjoining parcels before
a seller has a duty to provide it. See Frandsen at ^ 16.
ii

- 1 Appeals

TheCou

,n^ n ^

of the Delta Report, that the Delta Report would have been of some interest and i flin < >iv
material. This conclusion ignores the facts of the case and applicable case law.
1

Ihe Delta Report Does Not Discuss the Conditions on Appellees'
I ,ot

As an initial matter, il *> uiidispukil Ilia! the Dcll.i KVporl docs noi Jiscn .., tun i. i(
intended to discuss, the soil conditions on Appellees' Lot. (R. at 450, 721.) It discusses the
Church Site. The Delta Report does not discuss the construction of single-family homes on
llif < "linn In Silt

III \ iis

whether a large slab-on-grade meetinghouse,

which is significantly different from a singK '

-, should in-1 onstrui uxi in

Church Site. Again, the nearest test pit to Appellees' lot is located 120 feet from a comer
ofAppellees lot. (K at 429 ..436.619.) Finally, the Delta Report does not reveal anything
MIMI

', '""itntdiets« h tl Woodsuk knew »IIMHI« Appellees5 lot, that surface level collapsible soils

were present on the lot that would be ren io\ ed clt irii lg coi isti i lctioi i Gi /ei i. tl iese facts, tl ic
Court of Appeals was incorrect to conclude that the Delta Report is material as a matter of
law. Indeed, these facts show that the Delta Report was immaterial to the conditions on
i Vppellees' lot. •
2.

The Delta Report is Consistent with
Report and the Field Report,

1! o SHB Report reveals the existence of collapsible soils to a depth of 2Vi feet in the
;

: eport reveals the existence of collapsible soils to a depth

of five feet 120 feet away fron i Appellees' lol

! lie Field Report,, wlneli is (he only report:

that addresses the specific soil conditions on Appellees' lot and superse< les tl ie ii if it n n i.f. .i.• it i

contained in both the SHB Report and the Delta Report, concludes that the soils below six
to eight feet on Appellees' lot would support Appellees' house.4

There is nothing

inconsistent between the SHB Report, the Delta Report and the Field Report. Both the SHB
Report and the Delta Report reveal the existence of shallow collapsible soils in the area
around Appellees' lot. The Field Report confirms that during the excavation for Appellees'
house, all of the collapsible soils disclosed in the SHB Report and the Delta Report were
removed from Appellees' lot. The Delta Report was not inconsistent with the information
Woodside had, and Woodside took appropriate steps to make sure that the collapsible soils
disclosed in the Delta Report and SHB Report were removed from Appellees' lot prior to
laying the foundation for Appellees' house. Therefore, the information contained in both
reports was immaterial.
3.

The Court of Appeals' Finding of Materiality is Based on a
Misreading of the Delta Report.

As is discussed above, the Court of Appeals misconstrued the actual contents of the
Delta Report. This misreading impacted the Court of Appeals' analysis of materiality. It is
understandable that if a builder had a soils report that indicated that collapsible soils were
present thirty feet from a lot to a depth of thirty feet, such information might be material. But

4

The crucial inquiry is what material information was known to Woodside at the time
Appellees' house was constructed. Having obtained a soils report for the general conditions
in the Subdivision and aware of the LDS Church's decision not to build a large
meetinghouse, Woodside took reasonable steps to confirm that Appellees' lot was suitable
for construction. Woodside then obtained a specific report that indicated that Appellees' lot
was indeed suitable for construction. Under Fennell v. Green, 2003 UT App. 291, 77 P.3d
339, once Woodside had the Field Report for Appellees' lot, any other information about
nearby parcels was immaterial.
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revealed collapsible soils to a depth of five feet at .1 tv4 pi 120 led u\s:i\ Iron" i n>?m ' of
Appellees' lot. (R. at 429,436.) fhat information is not material given that more than that
amount

I MH! ^ould be (and in fact was) removed during construction and in light of the

coi itei its o f tl le F iel(I R eport,<". \ 11 n • 11i" o 111. \ i«i s i111 e \ i 1111 i 11 a 11 u 11 o 111 u' s oils below a depth of five
feet on Appellees' lot

I

T h e Court of Appeals has Created an Onerous N e w Duty for
Builders a n d Developers that Unreasonably Exposes Them to
Fraud Liability W h e n No Fraud has Occurred,

1 1 :te Coi ii t : f \ ppeals' i i dii ig as it pi esei itl> stai ids w ill si lb ject builders to fraud
liability unless they disclose every piece of information coiKriiiiii! flu™ aiea siii'i in Him

In

parcel they are selling that may be "of some interest to the buyer," regardless of whether the
ormation pertains to the conditions on the properly being purchased, regardless of whether
I In* I nm si* o( iinniiui ronslnu 0 >n rlimiiiitln; the i nmjifimi <is described til the information,
and regardless of whether the buyer has requested the informatic >n

It = 1 101 .1 :1 ;:: il •>« : 1 >e

emphasized that there is no evidence that Woodside even possessed the Delta Report during
(lit i.' In tint tinii1 frame, If tl le Delta Report is considered material based upon the facts of
this case, builders will be ^uhp'*! '<» I'uud liahtio,, u n l r 1 mi'm p i u u d e every piece of
information concerning not only their subdivision but the surrounui u* unotwithstanding the specific efforts the builder makes to determine suitability for
u>n .liiitdoii .IIHI in ttjuK problems for their project 5 It is instructive that no other court has

5

There is no need for the Court to create a duty for builders that lowers the threshold
for proving fraud as the Court of Appeals did in this case. Buyers still have available to them

recognized such a draconian duty. To impose such a duty, especially in the context presented
here of deep subsurface soil conditions on other property, would create uncertainty and
litigation regarding disclosure obligations.
B.

Woodside Did Not Possess the Delta Report Until After it Constructed
Appellees' House and Did Not Have a Duty to Discover Conditions on
Adjacent Property,
1.

Woodside Did Not Possess the Delta Report Until After Appellees'
House was Constructed.

The undisputed facts show that while Woodside was aware of the general conclusions
of the Delta Report and that the LDS Church decided not to construct a large meetinghouse
on the parcel covered by the Delta Report, it was not in possession of the Delta Report nor
aware of the specific findings of the Delta Report until after Appellees' house was built.
(See Undisputed Facts 11-13 supra.) Appellees raised nothing more than speculation below
to contradict these facts, and pursuant to Utah Rule of Judicial Administration 4-501(2)(b),
those facts must therefore be deemed admitted.
2.

Woodside Did Not Have a Duty to Investigate Neighboring Parcels.

Woodside's responsibility as a builder is to make sure that a subject lot is suitable for
construction. See Frandsen, 2004 UT 55, «([ 16. This duly does not impose a burden on
Woodside to investigate neighboring parcels, and to create such a duty would essentially
transform fraud claims into more easily proved negligence claims. Woodside's duty is to

all of the contractual remedies they negotiate in the contract to purchase property and/or a
house. Just as Appellees pursued their contract claims in this case in arbitration and were
compensated by Woodside for those claims, a buyer can pursue a contractual action against
a builder and be compensated for any economic loss without creating duties for builders that
will make it impossible for them to avoid fraud claims.
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kiiun ol Ihc roihlitioiis (in lli<; ',uh|crl lull, In llii\ rusr, ^ Yitoihidi" obl.tined the SI IB R eport
for the Subdivision and the Field Report for Appellees' lot and had no further obligation to
discover conditions on neighboring parcels. If Woodside is aware of adverse conditions on
neighboring land, it has a responsibility to make sure that those conditions are not present on
fitc :\:ii!'»((Yi l<i( See Fennel! v. (Jieen, :'U«h I I I \[iji "'ill ' I" M l^'i

In IIIIK u s e ,

Woodside fulfilled its duty under applicable Utah law. 6 Woodside was not unuci J

>

discover conditions on neighboring property.
If a court were to impose a duty to investigate neighboring parcels on a builder, it is

builder's failure to investigate a parcel on the other side of a mountain could subject it to
fraud liability. It would be unreasonable to impose such a burden on builders.
3,

Even if the Court Imputes Knowledge of the Contents of the Delta
Report to Woodside, It Does Not Change the Knowledge Woodside
had Concerning Appellees' Lot.

Woodside did not possess the Delta Report at the time Appellees' house was
constructed and was not aware of its specific findings. Nevertheless, at oral argument before
the district court atid iii tlle briefing to the Court of Appeals and this Court, Woodside has

contents of the Delta Report to Woodside. The Court of Appeals failed to impute such
knowledge in its ruling. Crediting Woodside with knowledge of the contents of the Delta
Report does not change the fact that tl le Delta R epoi t does not reveal the presence of

6

Woodside's di ity i 11 iclc t i: ipplical >k I Jtal i lb i i;v is desci ibed it 11 noi e detail 1: »elov '
ic

collapsible soils o n Appellees' lot or that Woodside removed collapsible soils from
Appellees' lot at a depth greater than what was revealed in the Delta Report.7
C.

Woodside Did Not Have a Duty to Disclose the Delta Report to Appellees,

The Court of Appeals concluded that if Woodside had knowledge of the contents of
the Delta Report it had a duty to disclose it. This holding creates a duty that contradicts both
precedents of the Court of Appeals and of this Court.
1.

Under Fennell v. Green. 2003 UT App. 291, a Builder Has No Duty
to Disclose Potentially Adverse Information About Neighboring
Property if a Report on the Subject Lot Shows That the Adverse
Condition Does Not Exist There.

The Court of Appeals' opinion incorrectly states that "[t]he sole basis for the district
court's grant of summary judgment was its conclusion that Woodside did not know of the
Delta Report prior to selling the property to the Buyers. The district court assumed that the
presence of collapsible soils on the adjacent lot was material and, for purposes of the motion,
Woodside did not dispute its duty to disclose." Yazd, 2005 UT App. 82,ffif6, 12 n. 3. The
district court did not base its grant of summary judgment ou whether Woodside possessed
the Delta Report and, in fact, assumed that Woodside had the report. (R. at 897-902, 904906.) Instead, the district court based its ruling on the holding in Fennell v. Green, 2003 UT
App. 291, stating "[Appellees] have not demonstrated that Woodside had any knowledge of
remaining collapsible soils on [Appellees'] lot. Therefore, [Appellees] failed to raise any
issue of material fact that would preclude entry of summary judgment in favor of Woodside."

7

The nearest test pit from the Delta Report, which was 120 feet away, does not reveal
collapsible soils below five feet. The mass excavation of Appellees' Lot for the construction
of the Yazd home went down to depths of six to eight feet.
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(R. at 900.) The district court properly understood the issue as whether Woodside had any
knowledge of collapsible soils remaining on Appellees' lot. It is undisputed Woodside did
not.
The facts in Fennell are remarkably similar to the facts here. The Court of Appeals,
however, did not follow or even mention Fennell in its opinion. Fennell stands for the
proposition that a builder has no duty to disclose potentially adverse information about
neighboring property if a report on the subject lot shows that the condition does not exist
there. In other words, once Woodside received a specific report for Appellees' lot indicating
that it was suitable for construction, it did not have a duty to disclose anything. See Fennell
2003UTApp.29l,1f 12.
In FenneU, the builder was aware of potential landslide conditions and retained the
services of a soils engineer to assess the plaintiffs lot. See id at ^ 11. Here, Woodside was
aware of the presence of collapsible soils on the surface in the area and retained the services
of a soils engineer to assess the soil conditions on Appellees' lot. (R. at 403-04.) In Fennell
the soils engineer determined that, if his recommendations were followed, the lot in question
was not susceptible to landslides and was suitable for the construction of a residence. See
k l at ^ 11. Here, after inspecting the mass excavation for Appellees' house, the soils
engineer concluded that all collapsible soils had been removed and that the soils on
Appellees' lot would support the construction of a residence. (R. at 403-04.)8

8

The contents of the Delta Report did not contradict the soils engineer's conclusions,
nor are the contents of the Delta Report intended to address the soils conditions on
Appellees' lot. (R. at 450.) The Delta Report discloses the existence of collapsible soils to
a depth of five feet at a distance of 120 feet from a corner of Appellees' lot. (R. at 429,

The facts in Fennell showed that the defendants had a report showing a landslide
condition, but followed the engineer's recommendations to make plaintiffs lot suitable for
construction of a residence. The Fennell panel
determine[d] that FennelPs fraudulent nondisclosure claim against [the developers]
failjed] because there were no facts presented to show that [the developers] knew of
a possible landslide condition on [plaintiffs] l o t . . . . Indeed, such knowledge was
refuted by [the soils engineer], who conducted the required soils report of [plaintiff s]
l o t . . . and stated in his deposition that he did not believe that [plaintiffs] lot... was
a landslide area . , . . Because [plaintiff] cannot establish that [the developers] had
knowledge of any such information, it necessarily follows that there can be no duty
to disclose the information to [plaintiff].
ML at HH 11-12.
Here, the district court concluded that the following facts were undisputed:
(1) prior to construction, Woodside was aware of the existence of collapsible soils on
[Appellees'] lot to a depth of two and one-half feet; (2) between six and eight feet of
soil was removed during the excavation for [Appellees'] house; (3) after inspecting
the excavation, a soils engineer indicated to Woodside that the underlying soils would
support the [Appellees'] house; (4) Woodside followed the recommendations of the
soils engineer i n laying the foundation of [Appellees'] house; and (5) during
construction and after the completion of [Appellees'] house, Woodside understood
that all of the collapsible soils had been removed from [Appellees'] lot.
(R. at 900, 905.) These undisputed facts show that Woodside had no knowledge of the
existence of collapsible soils on Appellees' lot even assuming that it was aware of the
contents of the Delta Report. Because Appellees could not produce any evidence to show
Woodside knew of collapsible soils on their lot, the district court correctly concluded that
Woodside had no duty to disclose the Delta Report to Appellees. (R. at 899.) The Court of

435-46.) More than five feet of soil was removed during the excavation of Appellees' lot.
(R. at 403-04.)
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Appeals erred by failing to apply the holding ofFennell to the undisputed facts of this case
and therefore the ruling of the Court of Appeals should be reversed.
2.

Under Smith v, Frandsen, 2004 UT 55, a Builder Has No Duty to
Disclose Information About Nearby Parcels Absent Inquiry From
the Buyer.

Instead of following the standard established by this Court in Smithy. Frandsen, 2004
UT 55, the Court of Appeals created a greatly expanded duty that a builder must follow in
order to avoid liability for fraud. Under Frandsen, a builder does not have a duty to provide
information about nearby parcels absent an inquiry from the buyer. Frandsen,2004 UT 55,
^[16. In Yazd, the Court of Appeals ignored this standard and held that a builder has the
affirmative duty to disclose information, without an inquiry, about conditions on property
other than the property being sold. Yazd, 2005 UT App. 82, ^f 15.
In Frandsen, this Court reiterated the duty a developer owes to a purchaser. A
developer has
"a duty to exercise reasonable care to insure that the subdivided lots are suitable for
construction of some type of ordinary, average dwelling house, and he must disclose
to his purchaser any condition which he knows or reasonably ought to know makes
the subdivided lots unsuitable for such residential building. He has a further duty to
disclose, upon inquiry, information he has developed in the course of the subdivision
which is relevant to suitability of the land for its expected use."
Frandsen. 2004 UT 55, U 16 (quoting Loveland v. Orem City Corp.. 746 P.2d 763,769 (Utah
1987) (emphasis added)). Based on the undisputed facts, Woodside fulfilled its duty under
the Frandsen standard.
In order to ensure that the lot purchased by Appellees was "suitable for construction
of some type of ordinary, average dwelling house," Woodside first obtained a soils report for
22

the entire Subdivision. (R. at 471-514.) That report revealed the presence of collapsible soils
to a depth of 2l/2 feet throughout the Subdivision. (R. at 507.) Although Woodside did not
have the Delta Report at the time in question, the Delta Report revealed collapsible soils to
a depth of five feet in the test pit nearest to Appellees' lot, 120 feet away. (R. 429,435-36.)
Woodside knew that more than five feet of soil would be removed during construction of
the homes in the Subdivision, and, in fact, Woodside removed the top six to eight feet of soil
from Appellees' lot. (R. at 403-04.) Woodside then asked a soils engineer to inspect the
mass excavation of Appellees' lot. The engineer concluded that the underlying soils would
support the proposed structure. (Id.) As the district court properly concluded, these
undisputed facts show that Woodside had no knowledge of any condition that made
Appellees' lot unsuitable for its intended use, and knowledge of the contents of the Delta
Report would not change that. Therefore, Woodside was under no obligation to disclose any
further information to Appellees. See Loveland, 746 P.2d at 769.
The Court of Appeals greatly expanded the holding of Frandsen by concluding that
Woodside had a duty to disclose the Delta Report if it possessed it. Woodside would have
been under a further duty to disclose the Delta Report had Appellees made an inquiry and had
Woodside not obtained a specific report for Appellees' lot. The record, however, is
completely devoid of any evidence showing that Appellees made such an inquiry. Despite
this, the Court of Appeals concludes that the information Woodside should have
affirmatively taken upon itself to disclose, without any inquiry from the buyer, was
information that did not alter Woodside's knowledge of the soils on Appellees' lot and that
Woodside did not have. Under a proper reading of Frandsen, Woodside had no duty to

disclose anything to Appellees about nearby parcels of land. In Yazd, the Court of Appeals
incorrectly created a duty where none previously existed and should therefore be reversed.
CONCLUSION
It is undisputed that Woodside was not aware of the presence of collapsible soils
beneath Appellees' house. Absent knowledge of such conditions, Woodside had no duty to
convey any information to Appellees, and therefore did not engage in fraudulent conduct.
To the contrary, Woodside made every reasonable effort to ensure that Appellees' lot was
suitable for construction. A soils engineer told Woodside that there were no collapsible soils
beneath Appellees' house and that the underlying soils would support the proposed
construction.

The information in the Delta Report does not contradict Woodside's

knowledge about Appellees' lot, and because it does not even address the soil conditions on
Appellees' lot is immaterial as to whether Woodside engaged in fraudulent conduct. The
Delta Report simply does not change Woodside's understanding that collapsible soils were
not present beneath Appellees' house. Because the Delta Report is immaterial, Woodside had
no duty to communicate its existence or contents to Appellees. As such, Woodside
respectfully requests that the decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed and the decision
of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Woodside be affirmed.
DATED this __j

day of September, 2005.
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS

IL
. Russell
Timothy B. Smith
Attorneys for Appellant/Petitioner
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
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ALIS. YAZD and PARVIN YOUSEFI,
Plaintiffs,
RULING
vs.
WOODSIDE HOMES CORPORATION,!
and JOHN DOES 1-10,

Case No. 020402197
Judge Gary D; Stott

Defendants.
This matter comes before the court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. On
May 28,2002, Plaintiffs submitted their Complaint alleging four causes of action. On August 14,
2002, this Court dismissed all claims of breach of warranty and compelled arbitration. The claim
of mutual mistake was likewise arbitrated. Therefore, Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment addresses only the remaining claims of fraudulent non-disclosure and fraudulent
concealment.
On September 29,2003, a hearing was held to consider the issues raised by Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment. Prior to the hearing, both parties submitted various memoranda
of points and authorities in further support of their positions. The Court has considered the
memoranda filed by the parties, the testimony provided at the hearing, the relevant case law and
statutory provisions, and being fully advised in the matter, issues the following ruling.

BACKGROUND
1.

Woodside Homes Corporation (" Woodside") owned land that became known as the
Panorama Point Subdivision ("Subdivision") located in Lindon, Utah.

2.

In preparation for the construction of the Subdivision, Woodside hired the geotechnical

engineering firm currently known as Amec Earth & Environmental ("Amec") to conduct
an investigation of the soils in the subdivision and prepare a report.
3.

Amec's Report indicated that the upper one and one-half to two and one-half feet of soil
were moisture sensitive and collapsible and recommended the removal of this soil.

4.

On or about March 11, 1995, Plaintiffs entered into a purchase agreement with Woodside
for the construction of a house on lot 304 of the Subdivision.

5.

Between six to eight feet of soil was removed from lot 304 during the construction of
Plaintiffs' house.

6.

William Gordon, an engineer at Amec, visited lot 304 during the construction of Plaintiffs'
house to inspect the soil removal. Mr. Gordon determined that the underlying soils would
support the house and made recommendations concerning the placement and compaction
of structural fill.

7.

Woodside understood that the soil excavation on lot 304 had removed all collapsible soils.

8.

Woodside followed the recommendations of Mr. Gordon before laying the foundation of
Plaintiffs' house.

9.

The Plaintiffs experienced cracking in the foundation of the house and settling of the
structure.

10.

Soil reports were also performed on land adjacent to the Plaintiffs' lot, including a report
conducted by Delta Geotechnical Consultants, Inc. This report was conducted on land
originally owned by the LDS Church, which was later sold to Woodside.

11.

The LDS Church had planned to construct a large single structure that was different from
the single family homes being constructed by Woodside.

12.

The Delta report indicated the presence of six to sixteen feet of loose to medium density
silty sand.
Ruling Page 2

13,

The Delta report did not include an analysis of lot 304, the lot purchased by Plaintiffs.

14.

Woodside was not in possession of the Delta report until after the construction and sale of
Plaintiffs3 house.
RULING
According to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment "shall be rendered

if the pdeadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." After reviewing the pleadings and listening to
oral arguments, the Court concludes that no genuine issues of material fact exist.
The only issue in dispute is what knowledge Woodside had regarding collapsible soils on
Plaintiffs' lot. The facts demonstrate that (1) prior to construction, Woodside was aware of the
existence of collapsible soils on Plaintiffs5 lot to a depth of two and one-half feet; (2) between six
and eight feet of soil was removed during the excavation for Plaintiffs' house; (3) after inspecting
the, excavation, a soils engineer indicated to Woodside that the underlying soils would support the
Plaintiffs' house; (4) Woodside followed the recommendations ofthe soils engineer in layingthe
foundation of Plaintiffs' house; and (5) during construction and after the completion of Plaintiffs'
house, Woodside understood that all of the collapsible soils had been removed from Plaintiffs' lot,
Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that Woodside had any knowledge of remaining collapsible soils
on Plaintiffs' lot. Therefore, Plaintiffs failed to raise any issue of material fact that would preclude
entry of summary judgment in favor of Woodside.
in deciding whether Defendant, Woodside, is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the
Court cqnsiders two arguments brought by the Plaintiffs: (1) whether Woodside's conduct
constituted fraudulent non-disclosure, and (2) whether Woodside's conduct constituted fraudulent
concealment.
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L Fraudulent Non-disclosure
In order "to support a claim of fraudulent non-disclosure a plaintiff must prove the
following three elements: (1) the non-disclosed information is material, (2) the non-disclosed
information is known to the party failing to disclose, and (3) there is a legal duty to
communicate.55 Mitchell v. Christensen. 31 P.3d 572, 574 (Utah 2001).
It is clear that the continued presence of collapsible soils would be material information.
Therefore, to decide whether Woodside acted fraudulently, it must be determined if any nondisclosed information was known to them and whether they had a legal duty to communicate such
information to the Plaintiffs. Given the undisputed facts, this Court finds that Plaintiffs5
fraudulent non-disclosure claim against Woodside fails because there were no facts presented to
show that Woodside knew of remaining collapsible soils on lot 304. In fact, the soil engineer, Mr.
Gordon, indicated to Woodside that lot 304 was suitable for construction. Because Plaintiffs
cannot establish that Woodside had knowledge of any such information, it necessarily follows that
there can be no duty to disclose the information to the Plaintiffs.
IL Fraudulent Concealment
Similarly, "[fraudulent concealment requires that one with a legal duty or obligation to
communicate certain facts remain silent or otherwise act to conceal material facts known to him.55
McDougalv.Weed. 945 P.2d 175,179 (Utah App. 1997).
There are no facts to indicate that Woodside remained silent or acted to conceal material
facts known to them. In fact, Woodside had no knowledge of the possibility of remaining
collapsible soils on the Plaintiffs' lot Therefore, because material facts were not known to them,
Woodside had no duty or obligation to communicate any such information and Plaintiffs5 claim of
fraudulent concealment fails.
This Court concludes that no genuine issues of material fact exist and that Defendant is
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entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Defendant's counsel is to prepare an order consistent with this ruling within twenty (20)
days of the date of this ruling and submit it for the Court's signature.

DATED this / 0

day of October, 2003.
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Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah
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Ronald G. Russell (4134)
Timothy B.Smith (8271)
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS

185 South State Street, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1537
Telephone: (801)532-7840
Attorneys for Defendant Woodside Homes Corp.

EST THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

A H S. YAZD and PARVW YOUSEFL
ORDER
Plaintifife,
Case No. 020402197

vs.
WOODSIDE HOMES CORPORATION,
and JOHN DOES 1-10,

Judge Gary D. Stott

Defendants.

Defendant Woodside Home Corp.'s Motion for Summary Judgment against Plaintiffs, dated
August 25,2003, came on for hearing before the Court, the Honorable Gary D. Stott presiding, on
September 29,2003. Ronald G. Russell and Timothy B. Smith appeared onbehalfofWoodside, and
Stephen Quesenberry appeared on behalf of Plaintifis.
The Court, having reviewed and considered the memoranda, affidavits, and other materials
submitted by the parties and the materials contained in the file, having heard and considered the
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arguments of counsel, being fully advised in the premises and good cause appearing therefor, hereby
ORDERS as follows:
1.

Woodside's Motion for Summary Judgment against Plaintiffs is GRANTED.

2.

Specifically, the Court finds that: (1) prior to construction of Plaintiffs' house,

Woodside was aware of the existence of collapsible soils onPlaintiffs' lotto adepthoftwo and onehalf feet; (2) between six and eigjbt feet of soil was removed during the excavation for Plaintiffs'
house; (3) afterinspectingthe excavation, asoils engineer indicated to Woodside that the underlying
soils would support the Plaintiffs' house; (4) Woodside followed the recommendations of the soils
engineer in laying the foundation of Plaintiffs' house; and (5) during construction and after
completion of Plaintiffs' house, Woodside understood that all of the collapsible soils had been
removed from Plaintiffs' lot
3.

Plaintiffs'fraudulentnon-disclosure claim fails because there arc no facts that show

that Woodside knew of remaining collapsible soils on lot 304, Plaintiffs' lot
4-

Plaintiffs'fraudulentconcealment claim fails because there are no facts to indicate

that Woodside remained silent or acted to conceal material facts lenow to Woodside, Woodside had
no knowledge of remaining collapsible soils on the Plaintiffs' lot

2
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DATED this _L_i_ day of November, 2003

Honorable Qfafr D. S
Fourth DistM Court
APPROVED AS TO FORM this

IP .day ofOctober, 2003,
SteffeetfQuesenbeiTy
J- Bryaa Qucscnbecry
Attorneys for Ali Yazd and VA
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the \J)_ day of November, 2003, they caused a
true and correct copy of the foregoing Order to be delivered to the following:
Timothy B.Smith
Parr Waddoups Brown Gee & Loveless
185 South State Street, #1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Sent Via:
Hand -Delivery
/facsimile
t / Mailed (postage prepaid)
_
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Plaintiffs and Appellants,
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J. Bryan Quesenberry and Stephen Quesenberry, Provo,
for Appellants
Timothy B. Smith and Ronald G. Russell, Salt Lake
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Before Judges Billings, Greenwood, and Thorne,
THORNE, Judge:
1fl
Ali Yazd and Parvin Yousefi (the Buyers) appeal from the
trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Woodside
Homes Corporation (Woodside). We reverse.
BACKGROUND
%2
In the early 1990s, Woodside began planning and constructing
a subdivision in Lindon, Utah. The subdivision involved three
parcels of land, the last of which Woodside purchased from the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day saints (the LDS church) in
1992 (the LDS parcel). The LDS church had intended to build a
large church building on the property; however, an engineering
survey (the Delta report) revealed that the subsurface soil was
extremely collapsible--a condition that leads to soil compaction
when water is introduced to the soil--to a depth of at least
twenty-seven feet. The LDS church, through its sales
representative, informed Woodside of the less than ideal
subsurface soil conditions, and according to the sales contract,

Woodside was to be provided with a copy of the Delta report after
the sale.
\3
Prior to purchasing the LDS property, Woodside had performed
its own examination of the subsurface soil conditions on the
other two parcels involved in its subdivision. The resulting
report informed Woodside that subsurface soil in these parcels
was collapsible to a depth of approximately two feet. In
response, Woodside added provisions to its plan for the removal
of topsoil to a depth greater than the average weak soil depth as
indicated by their engineering survey. After purchasing the LDS
parcel, Woodside chose not to replicate its engineering survey,
instead it chose to rely on its existing engineering report1
without examining the soil on the LDS parcel. Woodside then
proceeded with its construction plans.
^4
In 1995, the Buyers entered into a contract with Woodside to
purchase a lot within the subdivision and to have a house built
upon the lot. Woodside did not disclose to the Buyers the result
of either its engineering report or the Deltai report. Thus, the
Buyers entered into the purchase agreement with no knowledge of
the subsurface soil deficiencies. The Buyers1 lot was adjacent
to the LDS parcel and approximately thirty fe^et from one of the
test holes drilled during the preparation of the Delta report.
After closing on the house in September 1995, the Buyers moved
in. Soon after, beginning in 1996 and extending into 1997, the
Buyers noticed cracks.in the foundation, the basement floor, and
the driveway. They also noticed that doors throughout the house
were no longer square. When they brought these problems to
Woodside!s attention, Woodside informed them that the cracks,
etc., were normal and the result of nothing more than natural
settling. Woodside then patched the cracks and assured the
Buyers that they had no reason for concern.
^5
The Buyers were placated by Woodside1s assurances until
2002, when they put the house up for sale. They soon had a
potential purchaser, but a prepurchase inspection of the home
revealed that it sat on a sea of collapsible soil. The engineer
who performed the inspection, Kenneth Karren, informed the Buyers
of the extent of the problem, and the Buyers learned, after
engaging the services of another soil engineer, that it would
take a great deal of money to repair the house and ensure that
the poor subsurface soil caused no additional damage.
^6
Consequently, in April 2002, the Buyers filed suit against
Woodside. ,The Buyers alleged that Woodside1s failure to disclose
1. Woodside denies having ever received a copy of the Delta
report from the LDS church, and thus denies having any knowledge
of the true depth of the weak soil on or near the LDS parcel.

o

the presence of the collapsible soil was a breach of the
contractual warranty and that it amounted to a fraudulent
nondisclosure. Pursuant to a motion to compel arbitration, the
trial court submitted all of the Buyers1 contract claims to
arbitration. Following the successful completion of arbitration,
Woodside filed for summary judgment on the Buyers' fraud claims.
The trial court granted the motion, dismissing the Buyers1
complaint after concluding that Woodside had neither real, nor
constructive, knowledge of the contents of the Delta report. The
Buyers now appeal,
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW2
^7
The Buyers argue that the trial court's decision to grant
Woodside's motion for summary judgment was incorrect. *
2. During the pendency of this appeal, Woodside filed a motion
to dismiss the appeal as moot, Woodside argued that because the
Buyers had received an arbitration award equal to their actual
damages, pursuant to their contract claims, they were precluded
from seeking any additional damages. In essence, Woodside argues
that further recovery is barred under the doctrine of election of
remedies and because the Buyers are not entitled to receive a
double recovery of damages for their claim. After consideration,
we conclude that Woodside is incorrect, and the issue is not
moot. Thus, we deny Woodside's motion.
Woodside failed to raise in the trial court either its
election of remedies argument or its double recovery argument.
"The defense of election of remedies is an affirmative one and
must be raised by way of answer, motion, or demand so as to put
the issue before the trial court, and is not to be raised for the
first time on appeal." Royal Res., Inc, v. Gibralter Fin. Corp.,
603 P.2d 793, 796 (Utah 1979) (footnotes omitted). Thus, we do
not address this argument, and deny Woodside's motion to the
extent it relies upon this doctrine.
Moreover, we have previously addressed an argument similar
to Woodside's concern that any additional recovery awarded to the
Buyers would amount to a windfall double recovery. In Brown v.
Richards, among a host of other issues, we addressed whether
damages awarded for breach of warranty and damages awarded for
fraud were necessarily duplicative and concluded that they were
not. See 840 P.2d 143, 152-53 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Central to
our determination was the nature of these claims and whether any
grounds existed to conclude that they may not be duplicative.
See id. Here, the Buyers1 fraud claim asks for damages not
necessarily duplicative of the breach of warranty damages that
have already been awarded. Therefore, we are not in a position
to summarily deny the Buyers additional recovery and instead must
deny Woodside's motion to dismiss.
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In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we
give no deference to the trial court with
respect to its legal conclusions. Rather, we
make our own determination as to whether the
record shows "that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law,"
Smith v. Frandsen, 2004 UT 5 5 ^ 6 , 94 P. 3d 919 (citations
omitted). Additionally, we view "'the facts in a light most
favorable to the losing party below.« M Goodnow v. Sullivan, 2002
UT 21,^7, 44 P.3d 704 (quoting Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. State,
779 P.2d 634, 636-37 (Utah 1989)).
ANALYSIS
%B The Buyers assert that during the purchase of their property
and the negotiations for the construction of their home, Woods ide
either fraudulently concealed or fraudulently failed to disclose
the presence of collapsible soil under and surrounding their
property. The elements required to satisfy these claims are
.identical. See Smith v. Frandsen, 2004 UT 55,^12, 94 P.3d 919
(equating the elements of fraudulent concealment with the
elements of fraudulent nondisclosure discussed in Hermansen v.
Tasulis, 2002 UT 52,1(24, 48 P.3d 235) . To establish either
claim, the Buyers "'must prove the following three elements: (1)
the nondisclosed information is material, (2) the nondisclosed
information is known to the party failing to disclose, and (3)
there is a legal duty to communicate.*'1 Frandsen, 2004 UT 55 at
Hl2 (quoting Hermansen, 2002 UT 52 at ^24) ; see also Mitchell v.
Christensen, 2001 UT 80,\3, 31 P„3d 572,
^9
There is little question that the information contained in
the Delta report would have been material to the Buyers in this
case. See Hermansen, 2002 UT 52 at \1S (defining materiality to
be "something which a buyer or seller of ordinary intelligence
and prudence would think to be of some importance in determining
whether to buy or sell" (emphasis added) (quotations and citation
omitted)). The Delta report stated that the subsurface soils
found no more than thirty feet from the Buyers' lot were unstable
to a depth of nearly thirty feet, and this information was
central to the LDS church's decision to sell the property, rather
than build on it. Although the report may not have dealt
directly with the condition of the soil under the Buyers' lot, we
cannot say as a matter of law that the information would not have
been of some interest to the Buyers. See id. Consequently, the
information in the Delta report is material.

n-i
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^10 We can say, however, that if Woodside possessed the Delta
report, or had knowledge of its content, prior to concluding
the sale with the Buyers, it had a duty to disclose the
information to the Buyers. "'The issue of whether a duty exists
is entirely a question of law to be determined by the court.,H
Frandsen, 2004 UT 55 at Hl4 (quoting Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d
149, 151 (Utah 1989)). In Frandsen, the supreme court examined
the duty that a developer has "to protect unsophisticated
purchasers." Id. at Hl6. Relying on existing case law, the
court stated that a developer has
"a duty to exercise reasonable care to insure
that the subdivided lots are suitable for
construction of some type of ordinary,
average dwelling house, and he must disclose
to his purchaser any condition which he knows
or reasonably ought to know makes the
subdivided lots unsuitable for such
residential building. He has a further duty
to disclose, upon inquiry, information he has
developed in the course of the subdivision
process which is relevant to the suitability
of the land for its expected use."
Id. (quoting Loveland v. Orem City Corp., 746 P.2d 763, 769 (Utah
1J?87)) . Applying this standard, the court found that "the law
imputes to builders and contractors a high degree of specialized
knowledge and expertise with regard to residential construction,M
expertise normally not possessed by unsophisticated purchasers.
Id. at Hl8. As part of this specialized knowledge, "buildercontractors are expected to be familiar with conditions in the
subsurface of the ground," id. at Kl9, and if there is a problem
with the subsurface soils, the builder is charged with a duty to
disclose.
^[11 Woodside argues that through its own efforts it discovered
and removed a layer of weak subsurface soils that existed
throughout the subdivision and that, through a subsequent
engineering inspection, it was assured that no additional
problems existed in the subsoil. Woodside, however,
misapprehends the scope of its duty in this circumstance.
Assuming, as we must for purposes of reviewing a trial court's
summary judgment decision, that the Buyers are correct and that
Woodside was provided with the Delta report prior to the sale to
the Buyers, then our focus is properly upon the Delta report and
whether it would have been material to the Buyers1 decision to
purchase. Having determined that the report would have been
material, as it contained information that would have been of
some interest to the Buyers in making their decision to buy, see
Hermansen, 2002 UT 52 at ^29, we conclude that Woodside had a
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duty to disclose the report, or its contents, if Woodside
received the report prior to the sale to the Buyers.
^12 Finally, and most importantly to this case, we address the
knowledge element.3 We note first that
summary judgment is almost never appropriate
in a fraudulent concealment case, except "(i)
when the facts are so clear that reasonable
persons could not disagree about the
underlying facts or about the application of
the governing legal standards to the facts or
(ii) when the facts underlying the allegation
of fraudulent concealment are so tenuous,
vague, or insufficiently established that
they fail to raise a genuine issue of
material fact as to concealment, with the
result that the claim fails as a maitter of
law."
McDoucral v. Weed, 945 P.2d 175, 179 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (quoting
Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45, 54 (Utah 1996)).
1(13 In support of their claim that Woodside knew of, or was in
possession of, the Delta report, the Buyers submitted a host of
materials attached to their opposition to Woodsidefs summary
judgment motion. Included among these materials was a copy of
the purchase agreement between Woodside and the LDS church for
the LDS parcel. Contained in that contract is a promise that the
LDS church would supply Woodside with "a copy of the soils report
previously completed on the project," i.e., the Delta report.
The opposition also contained the deposition testimonies of
Kenneth Karren and Blaine Livingston. Karren, an engineer hired
to inspect the Buyers' home during their attempt to sell the
property, testified that to the best of his recollection Woodside
had received the Delta report and that he had been given portions
of the report while he was investigating the damage to another
house in the same neighborhood in 1996. Livingston, who was the
LDS church's real estate sales representative for the sale of the
LDS parcel, testified that prior to the sale he had informed
Woodside of the existence of the Delta report and that the
parcel's subsurface soil condition was less than ideal.

3. The sole basis for the trial court's grant of summary
judgment was its conclusion that Woodside dxd not know of the
Delta report prior to selling the property to the Buyers. The
trial court assumed that the presence of collapsible soil on the
adjacent lot was material and, for purposes of the motion,
Woodside did not dispute its duty to disclose.

^14 In contrast, Woodside denies ever receiving a copy of the
Delta report, and claims that although it was informed of the
presence of collapsible soil on the parcel, it was not made aware
of the scope of the problem. However, when faced with a summary
judgment issue, we are compelled to draw the facts and inferences
in the favor of the nonmovingr panty—in this case the Buyers--and
after doing so, we conclude that sufficient disputed material
facts exist to create a genuine issue for trial. See Hermansen,
2002 UT 52 at f31.
CONCLUSION
1(15 The Delta report contained information that likely bore on
the stability of the land upon which the Buyers1 home was built.
If Woodside was privy to the information contained in the report
prior to selling the property and building the Buyers1 home,
Woodside had a duty to disclose this information. Thus, the
question of whether Woodside received the Delta report is
material to the Buyers' allegations of fraudulent concealment and
nondisclosure. Because the Buyers presented sufficient evidence
to support their claim that Woodside received the report prior to
the sale, summary judgment was improperly granted.
^16 Accordingly, we reverse the trial court1s grant of
Woodside1s motion for summary judgment and remand for proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

•sf. 7

William A. Thorne Jr

\\1

udge

WE CONCUR:

JGtlith M. Billings,
Presiding Judge

/ .

amela T. Greenwood, Judge
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2003 UTApp 291
James Ashley FENNELL II,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
Edward D. GREEN; Neil Wall aka Neil J.
Wall; and GMW Development, Inc. dba
Ivory North, Defendants and Appellees.
No. 20011029-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Aug. 21, 2003.
Homeowner sued builder and developers
for intentional failure to disclose, negligent
failure to disclose, and breach of implied
warranty, following landslide on his lot The
District Court, Second District, Layton Departbent, Thomas L. Kay, J., granted1 defendants summary judgment, and homeowner
appealed The Court of Appeals, Greenwood,
J., held that: (1) trial court did not abuse its
discretion in finding that homeowner admitted the undisputed facts alleged by defendants; (2) defendants did not know that lot
home was built on contained a landslide area,
for purposes of homeowner's fraudulent nondisclosure and negligent misrepresentation
claims; (3) economic loss rule prevented
homeowner from claiming damages for loss
in the value of his lot under his negligent
misrepresentation claim; and (4) the implied
warranty of habitability has not been extended to purchasers of residential property.
Affirmed.
1. Motions <2^l
The trial court has discretion in requiring compliance with Judicial Administration
Rule setting forth uniform procedures for
motions and supporting memoranda Judicial Administration Rule 4-501(2)(B) (2000).
2. Judgment <£=>183
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in
requiring compliance with rule regarding
memoranda submitted in opposition to motions for summary judgment, and thus ruling
that facts stated by defendants in their motion as uncontroverted were admitted, where
plaintiff in his response did not refer to

defendants' statements of uncontroverted
facts, but instead only included his own statement of undisputed facts. Judicial Administration Rule 4-501(2X6) (2000).
3. Fraud <S=>16
To support a claim of fraudulent nondisclosure a plaintiff must prove the following
three elements: (1) the nondisclosed information is material; (2) the nondisclosed information is known to the party failing to disclose;
and (3) there is a legal duty to communicate.
4. Fraud ^=^16
Developers did not know that lot home
was built on contained a landslide area, for
purposes of homeowner's fraudulent nondisclosure claim against developers, where person who conducted soil testing on behalf of
developers concluded that though there was
an undercut by a creek there was not a slide
area on the lot.
5. Fraud <s=>25, 32
Economic loss rule prevented homeowner, under his claim of negligent misrepresentation against developers, from claiming
damages due to a decrease in the value of his
lot as a result of a landslide, as homeowner
bought property from building contractor
and did not have a contractual relationship
with developers, homeowner could not impose his economic expectations on non-contracting parties, and damaged property was
part of the "package" homeowner contracted
for with building contractor.
6. Negligence <$=>463
The economic loss rule prevents a party
from claiming economic damages in negligence absent physical property damage or
bodily injury.
7. Products Liability <£=>17.1
"Economic loss," for purposes of the economic loss rule which prevents a party from
claim such losses in negligence absent physical property damage or bodily injury, is defined as damages for inadequate value, costs
of repair and replacement of the defective
product, or consequential loss of profits as
well as the diminution in the value of the
product because it is inferior in quality and
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does not work for the general purposes for
which it was manufactured and sold.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and definitions.

8. Contracts <^205.35{1)
A cause of action for breach of an implied warranty of habitability does not extend
to purchasers of residential property.
9. Fraud <S^13(3)
An effective claim for negligent misrepresentation requires that the party making
the misrepresentation was in a superior position to know of the material fact
10. Fraud <^13(3), 16
Home builder did not have any knowledge of landslide condition on lot that it was
required to disclose to homeowner, for purposes of homeowner's fraudulent nondisclosure and negligent misrepresentation claims
against home builder, where person who conducted soil testing on behalf of developers
concluded that though there was an undercut
by a creek there was not a slide area on the
lot, and homeowner admitted in his complaint
that developers did not disclose to home
builder that there was a geological hazard on
the lot
11. Contracts <&=>205.35(2,4)
Homeowner did not have a cause of action for breach of an implied warranty of
habitability against home builder due to landslide that occurred on his lot, as such a cause
of action did not extend to purchasers of
residential property, and builder specifically
excluded the claim contractually in homeowner's contract for the purchase of the lot.

Lavar E. Stark and Frank M. Wells, Ogden, for Appellant.
Paul M. Belnap, Andrew D. Wright, Byron
G. Martin, Strong & Hanni, Brandon B.
Hobbs, Christian S. Collins, Elizabeth A.
Hruby-Mills, Richards Brandt Miller & Nelson, Barbara K. Berrett, and Kumen L. Taylor, Berrett & Associates LC, Salt Lake City;
and David R. Hamilton, Smith Knowles &
Hamilton, PC, Ogden, for Appellees.

Before JACKSON, P J , and BILLINGS,
Associate P J. f and GREENWOOD, J.
OPINION
GREENWOOD, Judge:
H 1 James Ashley Fennell II appeals the
trial court's grant of summary judgment in
favor of defendants Edward D. Green, Neil
Wall, and GMW Development, Inc., dba Ivory North (Ivory North) (collectively, Defen
dants). We affirm.
BACKGROUND
12 Green and Wall were partners in development of the Falcon Ridge Subdivision (the
Subdivision) in Layton, Utah, which included
lot 31. Layton City required a soils report
to be conducted on the Subdivision prior to
its development Green and Wall hired
Glenn R. Maughan to conduct the required
soils report The soils report was completed
October 7, 1992, with additional testing completed on lot 31 and reported on October 9,
1992. Maughan's October 9 soils report stated that a scarp existed "on the north 20 feet
of Lot # [31V which was determined to be a
landfall. Maughan recommended that "the
road right-of-way to Beech Adams be placed
along the inside of the fence .. [which]
would reduce the slope to Kays Creek
[and that] a 45-degree angle would be sufficient . . . [but that] a 15-degree safety factor
is recommended." Maughan's report was
filed with Layton City and available for public inspection. Bill Flanders, the Layton
City engineer, reviewed the soils report and
determined that Green and Wall had "complied with all of the necessary regulations
and standards to gain approval from Layton
City for the Falcon Ridge Subdivision/'
Subsequently, Layton City approved the
Subdivision for residential building.
H 3 [vory North is a real estate developer.
Fennell expressed interest in [vory North
constructing a home for him on lot 31. On
May 18, 1995, Fennell entered into an agreement with Ivory North for the purchase of a
home to be built on lot 31 of the Subdivision.
Pursuant to the agreement, Ivory North purchased lot 31 from Wall and Green. Fennell
had no contact with Wall and Green. Ivory
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North then built a home on lot 31 and transferred title to Fennel! on December 22, 1995.
In April 1998, a landslide occurred on lot 31.
No one was injured and the only damage was
to landscaping.1 However, Fennell claims
,faQvalue of lot 31 greatly decreased because
of the landslide.
14 On April 7, 2000, Fennell filed a complaint against Green, Wall, and Ivory North
alleging intentional failure to disclose, negligent failure to disclose, and breach of an
implied warranty. All Defendants filed motions for summary judgment After a hearing, the trial court granted Defendants' motions for summary judgment based on (1)
Fennell's failure to comply with rule 450K2XB1) of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration by not specifically controverting
the facts as set forth by Defendants in the
memoranda in support of their motions for
summary judgment, (2) Fennell's failure to
establish that any of the Defendants knew lot
31 was susceptible to landslides, (3) the economic loss rule, and (4) Utah's refusal to
recognize implied warranties for residential
property.
K 5 This appeal followed.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
16 Fennell appeals, claiming the trial
court erred in granting Defendants' motions
for summary judgment "Summary judgment is granted only when 'there is no genuine issue as to any material fact' and the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law/," Bearden v. Croft, 2001 UT
76,15, 31 P.3d 537 (quoting Utah R. Civ. P.
56(c)) "In reviewing a grant of summary
judgment, [this court!
gives 'no deference
to the trial court's conclusions of law: those
conclusions are reviewed for correctness.'"
M (quoting Blue Cross & Blue Shield v
State, 779 P.2d 634, 636-37 (Utah 1989)).
1. However, in his motion in opposition to sum
mary judgment, Fennell alleges that there was
also damage to a wall
2

The trial court noted its frustration with Fen
nell's repl) memoranda to Defendants' motions

ANALYSIS
I. Rule 4-50K2XB)
H 7 Fennell appeals the trial court's grant
of summary judgment in favor of Defendants
based on his failure to comply with rule 4601(2X8) of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration. At the time the motions for
summary judgment were filed, rule 4501(2)(B) stated:
The points and authorities in opposition to
a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a section thai contains a concise
statement of material facts as to which the
party contends a genuine issue exists
Each disputed fact shall be stated in separate numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions of the record
upon which the opposing party relies and,
if applicable, shall state the numbered sentence or sentences of the movant's facts
that are disputed. All material facts set
forth in the movant's statement and properly supported by an accurate reference to
the record shall be deemed admitted for
the purpose of summary judgment unless
specifically controverted by the opposing
party's statement
Utah R. JuA Admin. 4-501(2)(B) (amended
November 2001) (emphasis added). It is
clear that Fennell failed to comply with the
rule. He did not refer to Defendants' statements of uncontroverted facts, but instead
included only his own statement of undisputed facts. As a result, it was unclear what
facts Fennell contended were disputed.2
However, Fennell argues that the trial court
violated his substantive rights and abused its
discretion when it required compliance with
rule 4 501. Fennell cites Scott u Majors,
1999 UT App 139,1112, 980 P.2d 214, as support for this contention. In Scott, this court
stated that the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration "are not intended to, nor do
they, create or modify substantive rights of
litigants, nor do they decrease the inherent
for s u m m a r y judgment
The court asked why
Fennell's counsel failed to follow rule 4-501 m
"responding to the summary j u d g m e n t 7 " Fennell's counsel admitted that he may have been
"deficient' in following rule 4-501
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power of the court to control matters pending before it." Id.
V8 The Utah Supreme Court, however,
recently emphasized the importance of
compliance with the Rules of Judicial Administration in Lovendahl u Jordan School
District, 2002 UT 130, 63 P.3d 705.3 In Lovendahl, the plaintiff sued for damages under a claim for inverse condemnation. See
id. at H48. The defendant's summary
judgment motion and supporting memorandum included facts and arguments that the
plaintiff, in opposing the summary judgment motion, did not address. See id. at
^50. The court noted that under rule 4501(2)(B) "all facts set forth in the movant's statement of facts are 'deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment
unless specifically controverted by the opposing party's statement'" Lovendahl,
2002 UT 130 at 150, 63 PM 705 (quoting
Utah R Jud. Admin. 4-501(2XB)). Be«
cause the plaintiff did not specifically controvert the facts outlined in the defendant's
motion for summary judgment, the court
rejected the plaintiffs claim that there was
insufficient evidence to support summary
judgment See id.

982 P.2d 586 (reversing trial court where it
did not follow notice requirement of rule 4^
506 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration). See generally Parker u Dodgion, 971
P.2d 4%, 497 n. 3 (Utah 1998) (affirming trial
court on other grounds but noting plaintiffs
response to motion for summary judgment
failed to conform with rule 4-501 because it
failed to set forth disputed facts and did not
contain numbered sentences). These cases
establish that a trial court may exercise its
discretion to require compliance with the
Rules of Judicial Administration, particularly
rule 4-501, without impairing a party's substantive rights. In this case, we do not
believe the court abused its discretion in
requiring compliance with rule 4-501 and
thus ruling that the facts, as stated in Defers
damts' motions and supporting memoranda,
were deemed admitted. We rely on those
adrrutted facts in addressing the remaining
issues raised by FennelL
II. Summary Judgment as
to Green and Wall
A. Fraudulent Nondisclosure

[J] fllO Fennell argues that the trial
court
erred in granting WalFs and Green's
[1,2] H 9 In addition, the trial court has
motions
for summary judgment as to Fendiscretion in requiring compliance with rule
4
4-501. See Hartford Leasing Corp. v. State, neiTs claim of fraudulent nondisclosure.
888 P.2d 694, 701-02 (Utah CtApp.1994) (up^ "To support a claim of fraudulent nondiscloholding trial court's exercise of discretion in sure a plaintiff must prove the following
refusing to accept supplemental memoranda three elements: (1) the nondisciosed inforoutside bounds of rule 4-601). Utah courts mation is material, (2) the nondisciosed inhave repeatedly upheld the necessity of com- formation is known to the party failing to
pliance with the Utah Rules of Judicial Ad- disclose, and (3) there is a legal duty to comministration. See id.; see also Golding v, municate." Hermansen v. Tasulis, 2002 UT
Ashley Cent. Irrigation Co., 902 P2d 142, 52,124, 48 P.3d 235. Defendants do not
148 (Utah 1995) (determining that failure to arjjue that the possibility of landslides on lot
comply with rule 4-501 made additional fil- 31 is not material information. Therefore, to
ings moot); cf. Price v. Armour, 949 P.2d decide whether Wall and Green acted fraud1251, 1255 (Utah 1997) (finding trial court ulently, it must be determined if any nondiserred in not complying with rule 4-501 but ciosed information was known to them and
affirming because error was harmless); Lo- whether they had a legal duty to communiporto v. Hoegemann, 1999 UT App 175,1114, cate the information to Fennell. See id.
3. Lovendahl v Jordan School District, 2002 UT
130, 63 P 3d 705, is a plurality opinion with the
Utah Supreme Court split on one issue However, the section instructive as to this matter re
ceived majority support See id. at % 3

4. Initially Fennel! claimed damages under a
claim of intentional nondisclosure
However,
there is no such cause of action in Utah The trial
court interpreted Fennell's claim as one of fraud
uient nondisclosure, and Fennell does not appeal
this interpretation
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** H 11 Given the uncontroverted facts, we
determine that Fennell's fraudulent nondisclosure claim against Wall and Green fails
because there were no facts presented to
show that Wall or Green knew of a possible
landslide condition on lot 31. Indeed, such
knowledge was refuted by Maughan, who
conducted the required soils report of, lot 31
and stated in his deposition5 that he did not
believe that lot 31 was a landslide area:
Q. O.K. My question is: Was the area on
the fl&t surface of [lot 31] stable as op
posed to the- bank itself where the stream
had undercut it?
A. It was stable at that point, yes.
Q. And .you felt there was not a slide in
that area, that [the] stream had simply
undercut it?
A. That's right But to protect it we put
the slope back so they—4,0 allow for future
sloughing.
Q.« Okay. So when you finished up your
analysis of this subdivision, you did not
believe this area was a slide area in any of
the lots, and that the only area where there
had been some movement was on lot [SI],
and thaVs because the stream had undercut the bank down below?
A. That's right
Q. Is that a fair statement?
A. Yes.
Q. And that's what youVe told us a few
minutes ago in my question, that you found
that area stable with only the exception of
where the creek had undercut down by the
bank below lot [31]?
A Yes.
Q. And from that observation and opinion
that youVe made, you determined that this
was not a slide area but just an undercut
by the creek, correct?
A. Yes.

that in your report and told somebody
ahoui it; is thai true?
A. That's true.
Furthermore, Bill Flanders, engineer for
Layton City, stated in his affidavit6 that
after reviewing the Subdivision plans for
compliance, he required Wall and Green to
obtain a soils study for the Subdivision. After reviewing Maughan's soils report Flanders determined that Wall and Green "complied with all necessary regulations and
standards to gain approval from Layton City
for the Falcon Ridge Subdivision/1
[4] f 12 Because Fennell cannot establish
that Wall and Green had knowledge of any
such information, it necessarily follows that
there can be no duty to disclose the information to either Ivory North or Fennell.
B. Economic Loss Rule & Negligent
Misrepresentation
[5-7] H 13 We also determine that the
trial court was correct in determining that
the economic loss rule prevents Fennell from
claiming economic damages under a claim of
negligent misrepresentation. The economic
loss rule prevents a party from claiming economic damages " in negligence absent physical property damage or bodily injury/"
SME Indus., Inc. v. Thompson, Ventulett,
Stainback & Assoc, Inc., 2001 UT 54,1132, 28
P.3d 669 (citation omitted). Economic loss is
defined as
"[djamages for inadequate value, costs of
repair and replacement of the defective
product, or consequential loss of profits
without any claim of personal injury or
damage to other property .. as well as
'the diminution in the value of the product
because it is inferior in quality and does
not work for the general purposes for
which it was manufactured and sold/ "

Id. (alteration in original) (quoting American
Towers Owners Ass% Inc. v. CCI Mech,
Inc., 930 P.2d 1182, 1189 (Utah 1996) (quotQ. So my question is If you had some ing Maack v. Resource Design & Constr,
~ data or an opinion that this was a land- IVJC., 875 P.2d 570, 579^80 (Utah CtApp.
slide area, you certainly would have put 1994))).
5. This deposition excerpt was referred to by Wall
and Green as support tor their statements of
undisputed facts

6.

Flanders's affidavit also supported Wall's and
Green's statements of undisputed facts
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H 14 The economic loss rule was applied in
American Towers where condominium homeowners brought suit against contractors for
faulty construction in the plumbing and mechanical systems. See 930 P.2d at 1184
The homeowners were not parties to any of
the construction contracts and had no enforceable rights as special beneficiaries See
id. at 1187. The court barred the homeowners from collecting for losses under the
economic loss theory, determining that any
other holding would "impose the [homeowners'] economic expectations upon parties
whom the [homeowners] did not know and
with whom they did not deal and upon contracts to which they were not a party." Id.
at 1192.
H15 As in American Towers, FennelTs
claim for recovery for negligent nondisclosure is barred by the economic loss rule
because "economic damages are not recoverable in negligence absent physical property
damage or bodily injury."7 Id. at 1189.
Similar to the homeowners in American
Towers, Fennell did not have a contractual
relationship with Wall and Green; thus, the
economic loss rule applies to prevent the
imposition of "economic expectations" on
non-contracting parties. Id. at 1192 Therefore, the trial court was correct in granting
Wall's and Green's motions for summary
judgment as to Fennell's claim of negligent
misrepresentation8

Green on Fennell's breach of implied warrai^
ty claim- However, Utah does not recognize
a cause cf action for breach of an implied
warranty of habitability for residential prop,
erty. As stated in American Towers Owner*
Ass% Inc. v CCI Mechanical Inc, 930 Pj>d
1182 (Ufcih 1996), a breach of an implied
warranty of habitability has not been extended to purcliasers of residential property. See
id. at 1193-94, The policy for refusing such
a claim was explained by the supreme court
The purchaser has the right to inspect the
house before the purchase as thoroughly
as that individual desires, and to condition
purchase of the house upon a satisfactory
inspection report. Further, if there are
particular concerns about a home, the parties can contract for an express written
warranty from the seller. Finally, if there
are material latent defects of which the
seller was aware, the buyer may have a
cause of action in fraud. Therefore, the
circumstances presented to the purchaser
of a residence are not closely analogous to
those of a relatively powerless lessee

Id. at L193 (emphasis omitted) (quoting
Maack v Resource Design & Constr, Inc.,
875 P.2d 570, 582-33 (Utah CtApp.1994));
see also Snow Flower Homeowners Ass'n v
Snow Fhrwer, Ltd., 2001 UT App 207,t 30, 31
P.3d 576 (following American Towers holding
that "Utah does not recognize a claim for a
C, Breach of Implied Warranty
breach of the implied warranty of habitability
[8] H 16 Fennell also appeals the grant of in the context of purchasers of residential
summary judgment in favor of Wall and property")- Consequently, the trial court
7. Two recent Utah Supreme Court cases have
interpreted the economic loss rule However,
they are not applicable here and can be distm
guished Grynberg v Questar Pipeline Co , 2003
UT 8, 70 P 3d 1, interprets Wyoming law and its
economic loss rule See id, at UH 39, 40-44 (determining that Wyoming had adopted the eco
nomic loss rule) Hermansen v Tasulis, 2002 UT
52, 48 P 3d 235, involves a suit brought by pur
chasers against their real estate agent regarding
knowledge of land stability See id at Wf3, 5
This case can be disUnguished from the claim
against Wall and Green because in Hermansen
the defendants had an independent duty to plain
tiffs as real estate professionals See id at H 23
8

Fennell argues that the economic loss doctrine
does not apply to Wall and Green because the
"injury or damage [was] to other property"
Fennell's argument fails because in American

Towers Owners Ass'n, Inc v CCI Mech , Inc. 930
P 2d 1182 (Utah 1996) the Utah Supreme Court
defined "other property" in construction projects
as including parts such as " land, design ser
vices, and construction of a dwelling,'" determining that the failure of one part, even if it
causes " 'a diminution of the value of the
whole,' " is " 'purely economic loss ' " ^ at
1191 (quoting Sensenbrenner v Rust, Orling &
Neale, Architects, Inc, 236 Va 419, 374 S E 2d
55, 58 (1988) (upholding summary judgment for
architect and pool designer who had no contract
with buyer, where pool was built on unsettled
ground which caused broken pipes and broken
foundation))
Therefore, where the damaged
property, the land, was part of the "package"
Fennell contracted for, he cannot argue it is
"other property" for the purpose of establishing
an exception to the economic loss rule
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rrectly granted summary judgment as to
penneWs breach of warranty da\«v
III
j^

Summary Judgment for Ivory North
Fraudulent Nondisclosure & Negligent Misrepresentation
(9 10] H 17 As stated above, "[t]o support
claim of fraudulent nondisclosure a plaintiff
must prove the following three elements (1)
the nondisclosed information is material, (2)
the nondisclosed information is known to the
party failing to disclose, and (3) there is a
leeal duty to communicate " Hermansen V
Tasidis, 2002 UT 52,11 24, 48 P 3d 235 Similarly, an effective claim for negligent misrep
resentation requires that the party making
the misrepresentation was in a superior posi
tion to know of the material fact See PriceOrem Invest Co v Rollins, Brawn & Gun
nell Inc, t l 3 P2d 55, 59 (Utah 1986) As
with Wall and Green, the tnal court was
correct in granting Ivory North's Motion for
Summary Judgment, as the undisputed facts
establish that Ivory North had no knowledge
that lot 31 was subject to landslides There
are no facts presented that Ivory North was
told of a landslide condition by either Wall or
Green, or that Ivory North determined, or
should have determined, that fact for itself
Furthermore, Fennell admits in his corn
plaint that Ivory North did not know about
the landslide conditions of lot 31, stating
27 Defendant Green and Wall partner
ship did not disclose to potential purchas
ers of the lot the geologist reports and
geological hazards of Lot 31 on the Subdi
vision Plat
28 Defendant Gteen and Wall partnership d\d wot dractos^ to potowtral purcbas
ers of the lot the geologist reports and
geological hazards of Lot 31 in the protec
tive covenants
29 Defendant Green and Wall partner
ship did not disclose geological hazards of
Lot 31 in the contract of sale to Defendant
[Ivory North!
30 Defendant Green and Wall partnership did not disclose geological hazards of
Lot 31 in the deed of conveyance to [Ivory
N|0rth]
Because Fennell cannot establish that Ivor}
North had any knowledge it was required to

disclose the trial court correctly granted
summary judgoxeat in favor of Ivory North,
on this claim
B. Breach of Implied Warranty
[11] % 18 Fennell had a contract with Ivory North for the purchase of lot 31 However, Fennell failed to contract with Ivory
North for a warranty against future landslides. Furthermore, the Heal Estate Purchase Contract between Ivory North and
Fennell expressly excludes any implied warranties:
Except for the [IVORY NORTH] WARRANTY ahd SELLER'S obligation to repair or replace
WALK-THROUGH
ITEMS: (a) SELLER conveys the PROPERTY to BUYER, "AS IS, WHERE IS,"
WITHOUT REPRESENTATION
OR
WARRANTY, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,
INCLUDING WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
FITNESS FOR A
PARTICULAR PURPOSE, HABITABIL
ITYOR WORKMANSHIP, (b) SELLER
makes no representations or warranties to
BUYER
regarding the environmental
condition of the PROPERTY (including
the presence or freedom from radon, hazardous waste or hazardous materials); (c)
SELLER expressly disclaims any other
representations or warranties regarding
the PROPERTY; (d) BUYER accepts the
PROPERTY in the condition m which the
PROPERTY exists on the CLOSING
DATE
In a similar case, Tibbitts v Openshaw, 18
Utah 2d 442, 425 P^d 160 (1967), the Utah
Supreme Court affirmed the tnal court's dismissal ol an implied warranty c\aim where
the purchase agreement between the two
parties specifically excluded the claim See
id at 161-62 Because an implied warranty
of habitabdity is not extended to purchasers
of residential property, and Ivory North specifically excluded the claim contractually, the
trial court did not err in granting summary
judgment as to this claim
CONCLUSION
119 First, Fennell failed, as required by
rule 4-£01(2)(R) of the Utah Rules of Judicial
Administration, to specifically controvert De
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fendants' statements of undisputed facts and
clearly identify undisputed facts in his reply
memoranda to Defendants1 motions for summary judgment Therefore, the trial court
did not exceed its discretion in determining
that the facts as presented in Defendants'
motions for summary judgment and supplemental memoranda were deemed admitted.
% 20 Second, the trial court properly granted summary judgment as to FenneiTs claims
against Wall and Green because (1) the undisputed facts establish that Wall and Green
had no knowledge of potential landslide conditions on lot 31 that would impose a duty to
disclose, (2) the economic loss rule is applicable and bars recovery for negligent misrepresentation, and (3) Utah law does not provide
implied warranties for residential property.
H 21 Finally, the trial court properly granted summary judgment on Fennell's claims

agaiqst Ivory North because (1) the undi$~
puted facts established that Ivory North had
no knowledge of potential landslide conditions, and (2) Fennell's contract with Ivory
North expressly waived any implied warratitfcis, including any warranty for the geologic
cal condition of lot 31.
K 22 Affirmed.
1 23 WE CONCUR: NORMAN H.
JACKSON, Presiding Judge, and JUDITH
M BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judg^
(Q
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holding to include all derivative medical mal|imply stated, despite the phrasing of the
practice claims.
Lmplawt, Dowhng's purported injuries "re
A tie] to or aris[e] out o f treatment rendered
'-L Bullen to Hoagland, not treatment ren
CONCLUSION
meed by Bullen to her Therefore, we hold
% 15 We affirm the decision of the court of
Sat Hoagland, not Dovvlmg, is the '4com
appeals and remand the case to the district
Plaining patient" whose cause of action, if
court. Based on the plain language of secany, IS s u b j e c t to the UHCMA's two year
tions 78-14-3(10) and 78-14-3(15), we hold
statute of limitations
This interpretation
that, in order for the UHCMA's two-year
dovetails with both the plain language and
statute of limitations to apply, the alleged
tuiderlymg purpose of the Act, and does not
malpractice must "relat[e] to or aris[e] out
foreclose the possibility that alienation of afof' health care rendered "for, to, or on behalf
fections claims may still be encompassed
of a patient during the patient's medical care,
within the UHCMA For examplef had the
treatment, or confinement" Here, the basis
alleged malpractice occurred during joint
for Dowling's alienation of affections action is
therapy sessions in which Bullen furnished
Bulien's conduct during treatment provided
counseling services to Dowhng and Hoagby Bullen to Hoagland, not an alleged defiland, the Act would almost certainly apply
ciency in the treatment received by Dowling
However, that circumstance is not present
Therefore, Dowling \s not a "complaining pahere
tient" and section 78-14-4(1) does not conK 14 Finally, Bullen contends in the alter- trol Affirmed and remanded for further
native that the court of appeals' decision proceedings consistent with this opinion.
directly conflicts with Jensen v IHC Hospi
tah Inc, 944 P 2d 327 (Utah 1997) Specifi
f 16 Chief Justice DURHAM, Justice
cally, she asserts that Jensen, which involved DURRANT, Justice PARRISH, and Justice
a wrongful death claim, stands for the propo
NEHRING concur in Associate Chief Justice
sition that all derivative medical malpractice WILKINS' opinion,
actions are governed by the UHCMA's two
year statute of limitations As such, Bullen
( o f K£YNUM8£RSYSTEM >
concludes that, even if Dowhng does not
qualify as a "complaining patient," her alienation of affections suit is still baned because
it is a derivative claim stemming from the
negligent provision of health care services to
2004 UT 55
Hoagland Even if Dowhng's claim could be
characterized as a derivative malpractice
Steve and Catherine SMITH, Plaintiffs
claim, Bullen misreads Jensen Rather than
and Appellants,
establishing a unifoim rule foi all derivative
v.
malpractice actions, this court in Jensen held
Mel FRANDSEN dba Mary Mel
that, because u [t]he majority of states te
Construction Co., Defendant
fuse[ ] to allow a decedent's hens to proceed
and Appellee.
with a wrongful death suit after the decedent
has settled his or her personal injury case or
No. 20020248.
won or lost a judgment before dying," the
"applicable statute of limitations is section
Supreme Court of Utah.
78-14-4 of the [Act][ ] and
begins to run
July 2, 2004.
at the time
the patient discovers or
Background:
Home owners brought
should have discovered the
injury " 944
action
against
subdivider,
residential deP 2d at 332 In short, Jensen addresses the
statute of limitations question solely in the veloper, contractor, and contractor's
wrongful death context, and we decline to employee for damages for negligent
adopt Bulien's suggestion that we expand its misrepresentation,
negligence,
and
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fraudulent concealment after the footings, foundation, and structure of their
home settled, allegedly due to improper
soil compaction and a general lack of
lateral support. The Fourth District,
Provo, Fred D. Howard, J., granted
subdivided motion for summary judgment Home owners appealed.
Holding: The Supreme Court, Durham,
CJ., held that subdivider's duty of care
only extended to developer and contractor,
which should have discovered alleged defect in property.
Affirmed.
Wil&ins, A.C.J., concurred in the result with
opinion in which Durrant, J., concurred.

L Appeal and Error <3^842(2), 863
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the Supreme Court gives no deference
to the trial court with respect to its legal
conclusions; rather, it makes its own determination as to whether the record shows that
there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. Rules Civ.
Proa, Rule 56(c).
2. Appeal and Error e=>852, 856(1)
The Supreme Court may affirm the result reached by the trial court ruling on a
motion for summary judgment if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent
on the record, even though that ground or
theory was not identified by the lower court
as the basis of its ruling Rules Civ.Proc^
Rule 56(c).
3. Appeal and Error <3=>611, 934(1)
Home owners* failure to include copy of
the summary judgment hearing transcript on
appeal of summary judgment entered against
them did not require Supreme Court to affirm summary judgment ruling under presumption that trial court ruling was correct,
as there was no claim that missing transcript
contained evidence bearing on the determination of the case. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 56(c);
Rules App.Proc, Rule 11(e)(2).

4 Fraud <3=>13(3), 17
Negligence <£=*210
»
In order to prevail under the causes of 1
action of negligent misrepresentation, neglj, 1
gence, and fraudulent concealment, a plaintiff I
must demonstrate the existence of a duty 1
running between the parties.
%

i
5. Fraud <S=>13(3)
\
Ordinarily, in order to prevail in an ac- I
tion for negligent misrepresentation, plain, i
tiffs must identify a representor who makes \
an affirmative assertion which is false,
i
I

6. F r a u d s 13(3), 17
J
A duty to disclose is a necessary element |
of the tort of negligent misrepresentation. \
1
7. Judgment <S=>181(33)
\
Negligence <S=>210
\
Without a duty, there can be no negli- \
gence as a matter of law, and summary \
judgment is appropriate.
^
8. Fraud <£= 16
]
In order to establish fraudulent conceal- 1
ment, a plaintiff must prove the following J
three elements: (1) the nondisclosed informa-}
tion is material, (2) the nondisclosed informa- \
tion is known to the party failing to disclose, ^
and (3) there is a legal duty to communicate.' \
9. Negligence <3^1692
\
The issue of whether a duty exists is;
entirely a question of law to be determined :
by the court.
\\
\
10. Negligence <^211
H
Torts <&*%
*
<\
Particularly in the realm of tort law, the
duty concept is a policy determination.
\
1L Fraud c=»17
jfJ
Negligence <S=>1205(1,2)
\
In order to protect unsophisticated pur-<|
chasers, a developer, subdivider or person^
performing similar tasks has a duty to exer|
cise reasonable care to insure that the subdi-|
vided lots are suitable for construction 6jJ
some type of ordinary, average dwelling^
house, and he must disclose to his purchaserj
any condition which he knows or reasonAjfe
ought to know makes the subdivided loty
unsuitable for such residential building, ^ |
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has a further duty to disclose, upon inquiry,
information he has developed in the course of
the subdivision process which is relevant to
fhe suitability of the land for its expected
use.

of the original purchaser but rather possesses some unique insight or information with
respect to the property, liability on the part
of the contractor or developer to the original
purchaser for a defect in the condition of the
house may not be extended to subsequent
purchasers.

12. Fraud <3^17
Negligence <s=>1205(2)
Absent intentional fraud, the duty of a
Stephen Quesenberry, J. Bryan Quesendeveloper to exercise reasonable care to
berry,
Provo, for plaintiffs.
ensure subdivided lots are suitable for construction and to disclose information develMichael W. Homer, Jesse C. Trentadue,
oped during the subdivision process contin- Bret S. Hayman, Thomas B. Price, Salt Lake
ues only until the vendee or his successor City, for defendant.
have had adequate time and opportunity,
through occupation of the land or otherDURHAM, Chief Justice:
wise, to discover the condition, and to take
effective precautions against it by repair or
INTRODUCTION
other means; thus, the duties running from
H 1 Appellants, Steve and Catherine Smith
vendor to vendee and subvendee persist
(the Smiths), filed suit against appellee, Mel
only until a subsequent purchaser knows or
Frandsen dba Mary Mel Construction Comshould know of a defect in the property.
pany (Mary Mel), seeking compensatory and
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 3&J.
punitive damages for negligent misrepresentation, negligence, and fraudulent conceal13. Negligence <3=>1205(1)
4
Duty of care of subdivider which trans- ment after the footings, foundation, and
ferred1 subdivided land to developer and con- structure of their home settled, allegedly due
tractor, which knew or should have known of to improper soil compaction and a general
defects in land, did not extend to ultimate lack of lateral support.
home owners, as ultimate home owners were
112 The trial court granted Mary Mel's
not similarly situated.
motion for summary judgment, and the
Smiths filed a timely notice of appeal We
14. Negligence <3>1205(2, 7)
affirm.
Like developers, the law imputes to
builders and contractors a high degree of
FACTS
specialized knowledge and expertise with reK3 In the early 1990s, Mary Mel purgard to residential construction.
chased land in Lehi City with the intention of
15. Negligence <^1205(2, 7)
developing the property for residential use.
Builder-contractors are expected to be In the period up to 1995, Mary Mel obtained
famihar with conditions m the subsurface of approval from local government agencies and
the ground,
constructed and installed the roads, curbs,
gutters, sidewalk, and utilities in what is now
16. Negligence <3>1205(2)
the Summer Crest Subdivision. On October
- Where a developer conveys property to
10, 1995, Mary Mel conveyed the properties,
a residential contractor, the knowledge and
divided and improved, to Patterson Construcexpertise of the builder, and the independent
tion (Patterson), a residential developer with
duties owed thereby, interrupt certain obliwhom Mary Mel had an ongoing business
gations running from the initial developer to
relationship. Patterson, in turn, conveyed a
subsequent purchasers.
portion of the property, lot 223, on the same
day to GT Investments (GT)
W. Contracts <3=>188.5(3)
Where a subsequent purchaser of a resi14 GT is a licensed general contractor.
dence is not similarly situated to the position GT, acting through one of its employees,
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Joseph Sharp (Sharp), constructed a home
on lot 223. During construction, Sharp "personally inspected the . lot and viewed the
condition of the lot before purchase and before building commenced." As the Smiths
assert in their complaint, despite the fact
that "the soil [on lot 223] was so soft that
anyone walking on it would leave an imprint," Sharp, allegedly as a result of his
lack of experience in contracting, ignored
this "red flag" and failed to order any soils
testing or other measures that would have
revealed that the soil on lot 223 was inadequately compacted. After completing construction, GT delivered a warranty deed to
the Smiths on August 26, 1996.

by the trial court " if it is sustainable on an *
legal ground or theory apparent on the r^i
ord,' even though that ground or theory \y« *
not identified by the lower court as the basil
of its ruling." Bond v. SDNCO, Inc., 2002I
UT 83, H 10, 54 P.3d 1131, (quoting Ortonv
Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1260 (Utah 1998)]t l
[3] fl 7 Mary Mel, pursuant to Utah Rul e |
Appellate Procedure 11(e)(2), urges thill
court to uphold summary judgment, a s s e r t
ing that since the appellants have failed w i
provide a copy of the summary judgm&ifl
hearing transcript, "the district court's Ae$m
sions aire presumed to be valid." Howevgifl
Mary Mel misconstrues the meaning of rulM
11(e)(2).
m

115 Since occupying the home, the Smiths
have experienced "significant settlement of
K8 The rule simply requires appellants t/M
the house, its footings, foundations and strucinclude
"a transcript of all evidence" relevaatj
ture." In seeking recovery for damage
caused by the subsidence, the Smiths argue to a challenged finding or conclusion. \Jlwm
that GT "knew, should have known, or negli- R.App. P. 11(e)(2). In this case, neith/^
gently failed to determine that the House party claims that the missing transcript caril
was built on inadequate soil material and/or tains evidence bearing on the determination
inadequately compacted soil." They addi- of the case. See Harper 1/. Summit Coun&fi
tionally claim that in subdividing and devel- 963 P.2d 768, 775 n. 4 (Utah Ct.App.199S)
oping the property prior to its conveyance to rev'd in, part and vacated in part on o\
Patterson, Mary Mel performed "certain ex- grounds by Harper v. Summit County, 20Qj
cavation work .. including filling in a low UT 10, 26 P.3d 193. Thus, appellants had
area or ravine" running through lot 223. As obligation to include the transcript in tKi
a result, the Smiths allege, Mary Mel "knew record on appeal.
that the lot [included] unconsolidated fill, and
failed to take proper steps to compact [the]
ANALYSIS
lot, and in fact concealed and/or failed to
disclose these facts to appropriate governI. THEORIES OF LIABILITY
ment entities and prospective purchasers."
It is upon these facts that the Smiths assert
[4] K 9 Appellants seek compensatory anj
claims against GT, Sharp, Mary Mel, and punitive damages against Mary Mel unde*
Patterson.
three different theories of liability: negliged
misrepresentation, negligence, and frauduSTANDARD OF REVIEW
lent concealment. In order to prevail und|
[1,2] 116 In reviewing a grant of sum- any of these causes of action, a plaintiff mi
mary judgment, we give no deference to the demonstrate the existence of a duty
trial court with respect to its legal conclu- between the parties. For example, withj
sions. Armed Forces Ins Exch v Harrison, spect to negligent misrepresentation, t]
2003 UT 14, 1113, 70 P.3d 35. Rather, we stated in Jardine v. Brunsudck forporafoi
make our own determination as to whether 18 Utah 2d 378, 423 P.2d 659, 662 (1967), g
the record shows "that there is no genuine "[w]here one .. carelessly or negligent
issue as to any material fact and that the makes a false representation . , e:
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a the other party to rely and act thereon, *a|
matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). Nev- the other party reasonably does so and
ertheless, we may affirm the result reached fers loss in that transaction, the represent
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Sarftoe^ e ^ r e s P o n s ^le if the other elements
;
Yfraud are also present." l

nying liability for an "implied" misrepresentation where the defendant mortgage company owed no duty to disclose information to
[5] % 10 Ordinarily, in order to prevail in
purchasers of real property). Thus, a duty
*in action for negligent misrepresentation,
to disclose is a necessary element of the tort
l^ntiffs must identify a "representor [who]
of negligent misrepresentation.
makes an affirmative assertion which is
[7,8] f 12 In addition, it is well-estabfalse/' Ellis v Hale, 13 Utah 2d 279, 373
lished
in our law that "without a duty, there
j?2d 382, 385 (1962); see also Baskin u
can
be
no negligence as a matter of law, and
yi^igajge & Trust, Inc, 837 S.W.2d 743, 748
summary
judgment is appropriate." Tall(fexApp-1992) (upholding summary judgment in favor of a third-party lender who man v. City of Hurricane, 1999 UT 55, H 5,
jriade no representations to plaintiffs in con- 985 P.2d 892 (quoting Rocky Mountain
nection with the purchase of their homes). Thrift Stores Inc v. Salt Lake City Corp,,
Indeed, Mary Mel makes a point of claiming 887 P.2d 848, 852 (Utah 1994)). Finally, in
thai it made no representations, false or true, order to establish fraudulent concealment, "a
fa the Smiths. The Smiths, however, con- plaintiff must prove the following three elefend that by conveying 'the property (jointly ments: (1) the nondisclosed information is
$ith Patterson) without indicating that the material, (2) the nondisclosed information is
lufwas unsuitable for construction, Mary Mel known to the party failing to disclose, and (3)
effected a representation to GT, which in there is a legal duty to communicate." Herturn made the same representation to them. mcmseu u Tosulis, 2,002, UT 52, % 24, 48 P.Sd
235; see also Fennell v. Green, 2003 UT App.
~'[6] % 11 In the past, Utah cases have 291, f 10, 77 P.3d 339; McDougal v. Weed,
acknowledged that "negligent misrepresenta- 945 R2d 175, 179 (Utah Ct.App.1997)
tion is a form of fraud,'1 Atkinson v. IHC ("Fraudulent concealment requires that one
iftwps., Inc, 798 R2d 733, 737 (Utah 1990); with a legal duty or obligation to communisee also Christenson v. Commonwealth Land cate certain facts remain silent or otherwise
.Title Co, 666 P.2d 302, 305,(Utah 1983) act to conceal material facts knoton to him").
("Negligent misrepresentation is a tort which Therefore, a duty to disclose is material to
grew out of common-law fraud."); Robinson each of the alleged causes of action.
v. Tripco Inv., Inc., 2000 UT App 200, % 31,
% 13 The pivotal question in this case is
21 P.3d 219 (Billings, J., dissenting) (identifythus whether Mary Mel owed a duty to dising negligent misrepresentation as a "speclose the nature and existence of any subsurcies" of fraud), Thus, interpreting the eleface defects, not only to its immediate succesments of the tort in a manner consistent with
sors in title, Patterson and GT, but also to
principles of common-law fraud, we have
the subsequent and more remote purchasers,
found that in addition to affirmative misstatethe Smiths.2
ments, an omission may be actionable as a
negligent misrepresentation where the defenIL DUTY OF RESIDENTIAL REAL
dant has a duty to disclose. Swgarhousz
ESTATE DEVELOPERS TO
Fin Co. v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369, 1373
REMOTE PURCHASERS
(Utah 1980) ("Misrepresentation may be
A Defining the Limits of
riiade either by affirmative statement or by
a Developer's Duty
tnaterial omission, where there exists a duty
to speak."); DeBry v. Valley Mortgage Co,
[9] K 14 "The issue of whether a duty
S35 P2d 1000, 1008 (Utah Ct.App.1992) (de- exists is entirely a question of law to be
}» We clarified this test m Price-Orem Inv Co v
, Mhnst Brown <fc Gunnell, Inc , 713 P 2d 55, 59
n 2 (Utah 1986), wherein we indicated that the
„ suggestion in Jardine that "all of the elements of
^Jraud must also be proven is dictum Although
we cause of action for negligent misrepresenta
Uon grew out of common law fraud, the elements
°f fraud need not be independently established "

2.

Because we find the resolution of this issue
dispositive of the case, we decline to address the
merits of Mary Mel's alternative argument that
the Smith's allegation of negligent misrepresentation is barred by the economic loss rule
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determined by the court" Ferree u State,
784 P2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989). Covets consider many factors, none of which is dispositive, in determining when a duty runs between parties. DeBry v. Valley Mortgage
Co., 835 P.2d, 1000, 1007 ("A duty to speak
will be found from 'all the circumstances of
the case and by comparing the facts not
disclosed with the object and end in view by
the contracting parties/ " (quoting Elder u
Clawson, 14 Utah 2d 379, 384 P.2d 802, 804
(1963) (citation omitted))),3

construction."
1984V4

681 P£d 1316, 1322 (tej

[11] ^ 16 Therefore, in order to pr^
unsophisticated purchasers, under Lovefa
a developer, subdivider or person perfoi
similar tasks has
a duty to exercise reasonable care t o |
sure that the subdivided lots are suitab]|
for construction o£ some type of on
average dwelling house, and he must
close to his purchaser any condition
he knows or reasonably ought to knd
[10] H 15 Particularly in the realm of tort
makes the subdivided lots unsuitable f(
law, "[t]he duty concept . . . is a policy detersuch residential building. He has a
mination." DeBry, 835 P.2d at 1003-04
ther duty to disclose, upon inquiry, injfoj
("Duty is not sacrosanct in itself, but only an
mation he has developed in the course
expression of the sum total of those considerthe subdivision process which is relevant,
ations of policy which lead the law to say that
the suitability of the land for its ex]
the particular plaintiff is entitled to protecuse.
tion.") (citations omitted). For example, poli5
cy was one factor motivating our decision in Loveland, 746 P.2d at 769.
Loveland u Orem City Corp., 746 P.2d 763,
[121 V 17 Notwithstanding our holding 1||
769 (Utah 1987), adopting the position of the Loveland, the duties owed by contract^
Wyoming Supreme Court extending the duty and developers are not without limitati)|
of disclosure to developers engaged in subdi- Even where a duty is found to exist, it dog
viding and improving lots for residential pur- not continue indefinitely. Absent intention|
poses. In Anderson u Bauer, upon which fraud, "it continues only until the vendee, m
Loveland relies, the Wyoming Supreme his successor, have had adequate time ah||
Court observed that "[a]s we developed from opportunity, through occupation of the lai||
a rural to an urban society, . . . [b]uilders or otherwise, to discover the existence of tl
constructing great numbers of houses ac- condition, and to take effective precautioi
quired considerable knowledge and expertise against it by repair or other means."
in the area and used engineering services statement (Second) of Torts § 353 cmt
and studies to determine soil conditions . . . (1965).6 Thus, the duties running from w
and other questions concerning suitability for dor to vendee and subvendee persist onj
3.

See e.g., Pnce-Orem Inv. Co., 713 P.2d at 60
(foreseeability); Christenson v.
Commonwealth
Land Title Ins. Co., 666 P.2d 302, 305 (Utah
1983) (privity oC contract); Ellis v. Hale, 13 Utah
2d 279, 373 P.2d 382, 384-85 (1962) (statutory
obligations); House v. Armour of Am., Inc., 886
P.2d 542, 549-50 (Utah Ct.App.1994) (whether
user possesses special knowledge, sophistication,
or expertise).

4.

See also Moxley v. Laramie Builders, Inc., 600
P.2d 733, 735 (Wyo.1979) ("The average purchaser is without adequate knowledge or opportunity to make a meaningful inspection of the
component parts of a residential structure.").

5.

See also Moxley v. Laramie Builders, Inc., 600
P.2d 733, 735 (Wyo.1979) ("The average purchaser is without adequate knowledge or opportunity to make a meaningful inspection of the
component parts of a residential structure.").

6.

See also House v. Armour of Am., Inc., 886 P .7
542, 550 (Utah Ct.App.i994) (recognizing
"sophisticated user doctrine" whereby the raaj
focturar of ^ product is relve^d <& -& duty to \
of the inherent .dangers associated with a pr^
uct if the purchaser is a sophisticated user ana J
charged with knowledge of the product); ^ |
generally Uniform Land Sales Practices Act, Utg
Code Ann. § 5 7 - H - 1 7 (2000) (relieving re4gj
tate vendors of liability where "it is proved til
the purchaser knew of the [vendor's] untruuiB
omission"); Restatement (Second) of To||
§ 388 (1965); id. § 353 (a vendor of real propg
ty is onl> liable for failing to disclose conditi^
on real property if the "the vendee does m
know or have reason to know of the conditiQHj
the risk involved, and the vendor
has i
to believe that the vendee will not discoverj
condition or realize the risk").
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until a subsequent purchaser knows or
should know of the defect in the property

to be the duty of ABC as builders to appellees: To furnish a safe location for a residential structure, and it may be negligence to
B Application to the Facts
not do so") See generally Annotation, Duty
£13,14] H 18 In this case, there is no dis of Contractor to Warn Owner of Defects in
oute that Mary Mel conveyed the propeity to Subsurface Conditions, 73 A.L.R.3d 1213
Patterson and then to GT. GT is a licensed (1976) (collecting cases from various jurisdicgeneral contractor in the state of Utah, and tions in which "it was held that a contractor lilce developers, the law imputes to builders who knows, or should know, of a defect in a
and contractors a high degree of specialized particular subsoil does not perform his conknowledge and expertise with regard to resi tractual obligations in a workmanlike manner
-dentiaL construction McDonald v Mia if he fails to notify the owner of the existence
of the condition").
necfci, 79 N J 275, 398 A 2d 1283, 1292 (1979)
("Whether the builder be large or small, the
f 20 The facts indicate that Sharp, the GT
purchaser relies upon his superior knowledge employee supervising the excavation and
$nd skill, and he impliedly represents that he placement of the Smith's foundation, had "no
is qualified to erect a habitable dwelling. He prior construction experience." Nevertheis also in a better position to prevent the less, GT is deemed to possess the knowledge
existence of major defects "), Grojf v Pete of a reasonably prudent builder-contractor
Kmgsley Bldg, Inc, 374 Pa Super 377, 543 under similar circumstances, and, as a matter
jL2d 128, 133 (1988) ("The professional build- of law, a builder of ordinary prudence would
er is expected to have the skill and expertise have discovered the insufficient compaction
to know how to guard against potential struc- on lot 223 See Coburn v Lenox Homes,
tural problems Moreover, the builder is in Inc., 186 Conn. 370, 441 A.2d 620, 624 (1982);
the best position to prevent structural de Foust u McKnight, 675 So.2d 1147, 1149
fects*"), Moxley v Laramie Builders, Inc, (La.Ct.App 1996) ("[A] vendor-builder of a
600 P2d 733, 735 (Wyo 1979) ("Consumer residence is considered to be a manufacturer,
protection demands that those who buy and as such he cannot avoid the conclusively
homes are entitled to rely on the skill of the presumptive knowledge of the defects in the
builder and that the house is constructed so thing he manufactures.") (citations omitted);
as to be reasonably fit for its intended use ") Schamens v Crow, 326 So.2d 621, 626 (La.Ct.
App.1975) (same); George B Gilmore Co v
[151 U19 In particular, builder contrac- Garrett, 582 So.2d 387, 393 (Miss.1991);
tors are expected to be familiar with condi March v. Thiery, 729 S.W.2d 889, 894-95
^iohs in the subsurface of the ground See (Tex.Ct App. 1987) (imputing knowledge of
%obdla v Wisler, 59 Cal 2d 21, 27 Cal Rptr faulty construction to residential builder). In
f9, 377 P.2d 889, 891 (1963) (holding a resi addition, the Smiths themselves allege in
dential contractor negligent where "a reason their complaint that GT "knew, should have
Ifbly prudent person under like or similar known, or negligently failed to determine
jarcumstances and as a result of making said that [their] house was built on inadequate
excavations for foundation footings would sod material and/or uncompacted fill."
|ave discovered the insufficient compaction
[16] 1121 The parties agree that Mary
|f the underlying earth material, and would
|ave caused soil tests and investigations to Mel conveyed the property to Patterson and
GT, both parties who, as a matter of law,
|§ made before proceeding with the build
%*), ConoUey v Bull, 258 Cal App 2d 183, possessed superior knowledge and expertise
§ Cal Rptr 689, 697 (1968) (finding a con- regarding the subsurface conditions on lot
l^ctor was negligent for "constructing [a] 223. Where a developer conveys property to
a residential contractor, the knowledge and
^ouse upon unstable and filled ground, con
||Jung an underground spring, without tak- expertise of the builder, and the independent
ing protective steps foi providing adequate duties owed thereby, interrupt certain oblipipage"), ABC Builders, Inc v Phillips, gations running from the initial developer to
In other words,
®2 P2d 925, 938 (Wjo 1981) C We hold this subsequent purchasers
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borrowing from the language of the Restatement, we find that by conveying to one having "adequate time and opportunity" to discover the subsurface defects in lot 223, Mary
Mel incurred no liability to remote purchasers of the property as a matter of law. See
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 353 cmt g
(1965). Mary Mel had no duty extending
beyond its conveyance to Patterson and GT,
to both of which the law imputes a high
degree of knowledge and expertise.7
1122 The present case is distinguishable
from those relied upon by the Smiths. For
example, in Lawson v. Citizens & Southern
National Bank of South Carolina, 255 S.C.
517, 180 S.E.2d 206 (1971), the South Carolina Supreme Court found a developer had a
duty to disclose to a subsequent purchaser
that "in developing and subdividing its land
into lots to be sold for residential use only,
[it] filled an enormous gully with stumps and
other rubble to a depth of twenty to twentyfive feet and concealed this fill by covering it
with soil." Id at 208. However, when that
case was decided in 1971, builder-contractors
were not universally held to the same high
standards that they are today. As the cases
cited above indicate, the adoption of buildercontractor liability is a fairly recent phenomenon.8 See Conklin v. Hurley, 428 So.2d 654,
657 n. 2 (Fla.1983) (documenting a trend
beginning in the late 1960s and extending
through the early 1980s whereby buildervendors were held liable to immediate purchasers under an implied warranty of habitability).
H 23 Appellants also point to Anderson v.
Bauer, 681 P.2d 1316 (Wyo.1984). In that
case, the court placed primary responsibility
on builders and contractors to ensure the
suitability of the land for construction of
residences. There, the lots at issue were
suitable for some form of dwelling house,
although some of the lots were admittedly
unfit for homes with basements. Id at 1323.
But, as the court observed, "whether the
particular house to be built was a house with
no basement, a half basement, a tri-level
7. In doing so we do not address the merits of any
suit involving Patterson, GT and the Smiths or
between Mary Mel and GT

house, or a full basement was a decision 3
involving the developer." Id Therefore, d l
court relied on the knowledge and judgnaenjf
of the builder in finding that the developJj
had satisfied his duty and was not liable 1
homeowners. Likewise, our decision
requires contractors to be accountable, eith
directly or through explicit warranties frm
their predecessors in title, for the suitabilitj
of the land upon which they build.
f 24 Those cases that do find develop!
liable ,to remote purchasers involve factiii
settings in which the developer was also
builder-contractor or otherwise include'
chain of title with no intermediate sop]
cated purchaser. See Barnhouse v. City'i
Pinole, 133 CaLApp.3d 171,183 Cal.Rptr
(1982); Washington Rd Developers, LLC 1
Weeks, 249 Ga.App. 582, 549 S.E.2d 4
(2001); Moxley v Laramie Builders, iW
600 P.2d 733 (Wyo.1979).
'J
u

C

Policy Implications

\

% 25 Our holding today furthers the puS
poses and policies underlying the recogniz|||
exceptions to the doctrine of caveat empi
and is not inconsistent with our prior caselaj
on duty issues generally, or Utah statu!
As a result of their superior knowledge,
dential home-builders in other jurisdictioi
have consistently been held liable to sui
quent as well as immediate purchasers. Co\
mopolitan Homes, Inc v. Wetter, 663 P.
1041, 1044-^5 (Colo.1983) (citing cases
eight different states in which subsequen]
purchasers were held able to state a cl
for negligence against a builder); see
Timothy E. Travers, American Law of Prj
ucts Liability § 38:19 (3d ed.1987); Mfcf
A DeSabatino, Liability of Builder of R<
dencefor Latent Defects Therein as Runnl
to Subsequent Purchasers from Ongil
Vendee, 10 AL.R.4th 385 (1981). Just as
lack of purchaser sophistication motivai
the initial exceptions to the doctrine of caV£
emptor, the expansion of builder-contrad
liability to encompass even remote purcfa
3. Stepanov v Gavnlovich, 594 P 2d 30 (AlgS
L979)f also relied on by the Smiths, is inappojjj
because it involves a suit brought by resident^
contractors, rather than homeowners, again#|
developer
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is similarly driven. Like initial consum> of residential construction, subsequent
, orneowners typically possess no greater so' jiistication that would enable them to discover latent defects in the property. Tusch
firiters v. Coffin,. 113 Idaho 37, 740 P.2d
1022, 1034 (1987) (" The same policy considerations that lead to [our adoption of the
implied warranty of habitability for sales of
new homes] . . . are equally applicable to
subsequent homebuyers.' " (quoting Richards v. Powercraft Homes, Inc, 139 Ariz.
242, 678 P.2d 427, 430 (1984))); see also
pwight F. Hopewell, C. Oates v. Jag- Let the
Buyer Beware—A Remedy for Subsequent
Purchasers of Homes in North Carolina, 64
N.C L.Rev. 1485, 1493 (1986) ("[A] subsequent purchaser of real estate is in a very
similar position to that of the initial purchaser. Both are innocent purchasers who lack
the expertise and knowledge necessary to
uncover every latent defect
. Thus, both
classes of purchasers deserve equal protection").

erS

[17] 1126 By implication, where a subsequent purchaser is not similarly situated but
rather possesses some unique insight or information with respect to the property, liability may not be extended to subsequent purchasers. See Tusch Enters., 740 P.2d at 1038
(Shepard, J., dissenting) (arguing that liability should be denied where "[tjhe plaintiffs
.. are not unknowing buyers of a residence
built by an unscrupulous builder/developer[.]
Rather, plaintiffs are a sophisticated and
knowledgeable group of investors in real estate"). As the cases cited above indicate,
residential builders and contractors are not
innocent transferees occupying the same position as the ultimate residential consumer.
Extending the liability of developers beyond
builder-contractors to encompass remote
purchasers is inconsistent with the rationale
upon which recovery by subsequent purchasers was initially based.

In addition, our decision preserves the contractual expectations of developers and builder-contractors. If unstable soil conditions
are known to both the developer and the
builder-transferee, the price of the land may
be discounted to reflect the added cost involved in correcting the defect. See Transamerica Ins, Servs. v. Kopko, 570 N.E.2d
1283, 1284 (Ind.1991) (dealing with a property transaction in which a buyer "was given a
credit against the purchase price of [a] new
lot to compensate [the buyer] for the expense
they incurred in correcting the soil conditions
on the previous lot"). By requiring plaintiffs
generally to sue up the chain of title, the
allocation of risk and expectations embodied
in land sale contracts will be preserved.9
CONCLUSION
U 28 We hold that Mary Mel's duty of care
and disclosure extended only to its immediate transferees, Patterson and GT, who
"knew or should have known" of defects in
the property, and not to the appellants. The
order granting summary judgment is affirmed.
129 Justice PARRISH and Justice
NEHRING concur in Chief Justice
DURHAM'S opinion.
WILKINS, Associate Chief Justice,
concurring in the result:
1130 I concur with the conclusion reached
by the majority opinion that Mary Mel owed
no duty to the Smiths, and that as such a
summary judgment in Mary Mel's favor was
proper. Mary Mel conveyed the lot to Patterson Construction, who conveyed to GT
Investments, who conveyed to the Smiths.
No theory advanced by the Smiths supports
extension of a duty to disclose that far. The
remaining analysis regarding the duty of
home builders to disclose subsurface conditions to buyers is dicta at best.

H 27 As a policy matter, we believe that out1131 We need not, nor are we asked to
holding will encourage builders and contrac- consider the duty, if any, running from a
t s to exercise that level of care consistent home builder to a home buyer to disclose
with the expertise legally imputed to them. non-obvious defects in the land that may or
9. it is, of course, likely that increases in costs

incurred b) builders will be passed on to purchasers, but presumably those increases will be

outweighed by losses avoided because of higher
standards in the building process

928

Utah

94 PACIFIC REPORTER, 3d SERIES

may not be known by the builder. To do so
in this case simply extends our analysis not
only beyond the facts and law considered by
the trial court, but also beyond the facts and
law necessary to resolve the case. There is
no need for us to rely on the law of numerous
other jurisdictions to fashion a new duty
under Utah law to be imposed on home
builders.
K 32 As a result, I would affirm the trial
court on the sole basis that the law imposed
no duty on Mary Mel to disclose anything
regarding the condition of the property to

the Smiths, and that as a direct result tl
causes of action advanced by the Smitj
against Mary Mel fail as a matter of 1^
133 Justice DURRANT concurs in
Associate Chief Justice WILKINS'
concurring opinion.

